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Abstract 
George Eliot’s response to Romantic ideology is critically established. While most 
scholarship recognises the influence of William Wordsworth on her prose fiction, the 
affinities between Eliot’s prose and the poetry of Samuel Taylor Coleridge remain relatively 
unexplored. A wealth of criticism has established Coleridge’s importance to nineteenth-
century philosophical and religious thought, as well as to aesthetic discourse; critical 
discussion of his poetic influence is usually linked with contemporary and later poets. He is, 
however, often invoked as a major influence on Eliot’s intellectual development. 
Evidence of Coleridge’s direct influence on Eliot’s fiction is difficult to substantiate; 
this study offers readings that diverge from previous analyses by foregrounding Eliot’s 
engagement with Coleridge’s language. Focus on the language used by Coleridge and Eliot 
reveals thematic and linguistic similarities, as well as convergences in their use of metaphor 
and symbolism. Where divergences exist, they are examined with the objective of establishing 
a development or progression in the way ideas and concepts are expressed in Eliot’s fiction. 
The nature of this progression is analysed in terms of Eliot’s increased preoccupation with 
materiality. 
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Introduction: A Strange, Striking Thing 
In Book First, Chapter V, of George Eliot’s Adam Bede, Arthur Donnithorne presents a copy 
of William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Lyrical Ballads to his godmother, 
Mrs Irwine: 
“I know you are fond of queer, wizard-like stories. It’s a volume of poems, ‘Lyrical 
Ballads:’ most of them seem to be twaddling stuff; but the first is in a different style – 
‘The Ancient Mariner’ is the title. I can hardly make head or tail of it as a story, but 
it’s a strange, striking thing.”1  
 
I was intrigued by Coleridge’s presence in Eliot’s novel, and by Donnithorne’s comments. 
The themes of Adam Bede seemed strikingly similar to Coleridge’s preoccupations in ‘The 
Ancient Mariner’: acts and their consequences; suffering and loss; sin and expiation. 
Donnithorne’s assertion that he cannot ‘make head or tail of it as a story’ elegantly 
summarises his inability to perceive the consequences of his actions. Wordsworth’s influence 
on Eliot as an author is well-established, but preliminary investigations revealed the absence 
of any equivalent body of criticism detailing a Coleridgean influence on Eliot’s fiction.  
 Aware that the field of literary influence is a highly contentious one, my initial 
research aimed to establish robust links between Coleridge and Eliot. I found that, where 
connections exist, they are tenuous and inconclusive. Biographical investigations reveal 
Eliot’s second-hand familiarity with Coleridge as an individual, through her connections with 
the Hennells and Brays in Coventry.2 Discussion of Coleridge’s general influence in the 
                                                 
1 George Eliot, Adam Bede, ed. Carol A. Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 59-60. All further 
references will be given in the body of the text.  
2 Coleridge’s correspondent Dr R. H. Brabant of Devizes had links with Eliot’s social circle during her time at 
Foleshill. The Brabant children were interconnected by marriage with the Hennells and the Brays, all of whom 
were influential in Eliot’s (Marian Evans at that time) intellectual development. Elizabeth ‘Rufa’ Hennell, Eliot’s 
friend and Brabant’s daughter, had been given her nickname by Coleridge. Brabant introduced Elizabeth’s 
husband Charles Hennell’s Inquiry Concerning the Origin of Christianity (1838) to David Strauss, who 
translated it into German in 1839. It was Charles Hennell’s sister, Sara, who asked Eliot to take on the translation 
of Strauss’s The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined, published in 1846. Coleridge had dictated his ‘Evidences of 
Christianity’ to Brabant in 1815; in this work, he details the separation, as he perceives it, of the ‘MIRACLES’ 
from the ‘material’ and ‘doctrines’ of Christianity (The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. H. N. 
Coleridge (London: William Pickering, 1836), Volume 1, p. 386). 
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nineteenth century tends to bifurcate; one branch of criticism focuses on his influence as a 
philosopher and theologian, and the other on his identity and body of work as a Romantic 
poet and literary theorist. He was an important - some writers claim the important - British 
exponent of Kant’s philosophy.3 Valerie A. Dodd cites the ‘profound implications’ of 
Coleridge’s work for later writers, including Eliot; she refers to Eliot ‘reading Coleridge in 
1841 at Foleshill’, and argues that Eliot ‘followed in the footsteps of Coleridge and Carlyle 
[as a] propagandist for German scholarship.’4 Other critics link Coleridge and Eliot as 
popularisers of German thought; most do not make Dodd’s direct connections, but 
characterise Coleridge’s influence as ‘diffusive rather than direct’.5  
David Carroll argues that Eliot’s ‘career and fiction can best be understood in the 
context of nineteenth-century hermeneutics’, and identifies Coleridge as one of the originators 
of that ‘philosophical tradition’.6 E. S. Shaffer locates both Coleridge and Eliot within the 
tradition of biblical criticism, tracing a progression over time from ‘the Biblical criticism of 
Coleridge’s youth [to the] medium of secular religious experience [of Eliot’s time]’.7 
Connections made by these critics are concerned primarily, then, with influences shared by 
Coleridge and Eliot, rather than with direct influence. Other thinkers are presented as equally, 
or more, influential on Eliot’s thinking; Carlyle, Rousseau, Strauss, Hennell, Feuerbach, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 Rosemary Ashton, for example, calls Coleridge ‘undoubtedly the most important interpreter of Kant’. (The 
German Idea: Four English Writers and the Reception of German Thought 1800-1860 (London: Libris, 1994), p. 
25). 
4 Valerie A. Dodd, George Eliot: An Intellectual Life (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 11, 6, 156. I have been 
unable to substantiate these references, or any of Dodd’s assertions concerning Coleridge’s ‘influence’ on Eliot, 
purportedly based on letters written by Eliot to Maria Lewis in 1841 (Dodd, p. 81). 
5 Ashton, The German Idea, p. 2. 
6 David Carroll, George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations: A Reading of the Novels (Cambridge: CUP, 
1992), pp. 3-4. 
7 E. S. Shaffer, ‘Kubla Khan’ and the Fall of Jerusalem: The Mythological School in Biblical Criticism and 
Secular Literature 1770-1880 (Cambridge: CUP,1980), p. 4. 
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Comte, Goethe, and George Henry Lewes are all claimed to have contributed equally to her 
intellectual development over time.    
The second area of existing scholarship addresses Coleridge’s influence as a Romantic 
poet and critic. K. M. Newton classifies Eliot as ‘an advanced or later Romantic writer’, and 
Tim Dolin enumerates the qualities in her writing that he believes make Eliot ‘a Romantic’.8 
Most critics, when they refer to Romantic elements in Eliot’s thought and fiction, focus on the 
influence of Wordsworth: ‘[w]ithout Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads, and his celebrated 1802 
Preface to them, Eliot’s realism could hardly have been imagined’, claims Dolin.9 Coleridge 
seems to have been elided as Wordsworth’s co-author here. M. H. Abrams and U. C. 
Knoepflmacher are among many critics who refer to Eliot as ‘Wordsworthian’, and trace 
Wordsworth’s influence on her fiction.10 When Knoepflmacher discusses Coleridge in 
relation to Eliot’s fiction, it is primarily to link her with Milton and with Wordsworth, who is 
‘deliberately woven into the fabric of [Adam Bede]’.11 Knoepflmacher does discuss the 
influence of ‘The Ancient Mariner’ on Adam Bede; he likens Hetty’s description of her baby 
as ‘a heavy weight hanging around my neck’ (p. 406) to the albatross around the Mariner’s 
neck, and notes that Hetty, like the Mariner and Wordsworth’s Martha Ray in ‘The Thorn’, is 
‘forced to enact an exemplary role’.12  
 Knoepflmacher’s identification of correlative imagery in ‘The Ancient Mariner’ and 
Adam Bede is persuasive, but not sufficiently compelling to support an argument for 
Coleridge’s influence on Eliot’s fiction. The generality and oblique nature of existing critical 
                                                 
8 K. M. Newton, George Eliot, Romantic Humanist: A Study of the Philosophical Structure of Her Novels 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 3, 33; Tim Dolin, George Eliot (Oxford: OUP, 2009), p. 88. 
9 Dolin, George Eliot, p. 89. 
10 M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (London: W. W. 
Norton, 1973), p. 83; U. C. Knoepflmacher, George Eliot’s Early Novels: The Limits of Realism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968) p. 17. 
11 Knoepflmacher, George Eliot’s Early Novels, p. 93. 
12 Knoepflmacher, George Eliot’s Early Novels, p. 95. 
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commentary on Coleridge in relation to Eliot makes unequivocal assertions about influence 
problematic, in an area already replete with problematic elements.13 However, fascinating 
correspondences in the language used by Coleridge and Eliot reveal thematic similarities and 
other areas of convergence in perception and presentation. Eliot writes, in Adam Bede: ‘[s]he 
couldn’t understand the sorrow; but, for these moments, under the subduing influence of 
Dinah’s spirit, she felt that she must be patient and still’ (p. 104). Her language and phrasing 
here are uncannily similar to Coleridge’s in ‘Dejection: An Ode’: 
But oh! each visitation 
Suspends what nature gave me at my birth, 
My shaping spirit of Imagination. 
For not to think of what I needs must feel,  
But to be still and patient, all I can.14 
 
Both quotations discuss the power of the spirit, but instead of Coleridge’s ‘shaping spirit’, 
Eliot has ‘subduing […] spirit’. Within this convergence at the level of language, there is a 
radical divergence in meaning. Coleridge’s imagination, his shaping spirit, is presented as 
something both integral to his sense of self and beyond his control. The prevailing tone is one 
of disempowerment: he lacks the agency to enact the desired re-engagement with his shaping 
spirit, and his stillness and patience are manifestations of his passivity. Dinah’s spirit, 
conversely, subdues, or attenuates, Lisbeth’s emotional pain; Eliot describes this process as 
‘influence’. The spirit is a faculty, subject to Dinah’s agency, which she exercises through an 
act of will, to comfort Lisbeth. It can be used, as it is here, as an instrument to affect and 
condition human interaction. 
                                                 
13 Harold Bloom’s concept of ‘hidden roads that go from poem to poem’, for instance, is problematized by its 
embeddedness in Bloom’s complex and arcane theories of influence, thorough examination of which is 
prevented here by lack of space (The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry, 2nd edition (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 
p. 96). 
14 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘Dejection: An Ode’, in The Complete Poems, ed. William Keach (London: Penguin 
(Penguin Classics), 1997), pp. 307-311, ll. 84-8. All further references will be given in the body of the text. All 
further references to Coleridge’s poetry will use this edition, unless otherwise indicated. 
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  This comparison foregrounds both convergences in language use and divergences in 
meaning in Coleridge’s poetry and Eliot’s fiction. The surprisingly high incidence of similar 
textual correspondences reveals a number of thematic and philosophical parallels pervading 
the work of both writers; it also highlights a number of areas in which they diverge 
consistently. Coleridge’s work presents, in many instances, an inability to escape the 
restrictions of subjectivity; this results in passivity, lack of agency, fragmentation, and 
reinforced isolation. By depicting the same, or similar, human propensities in the context of 
interaction with others, Eliot presents a manifesto for the sympathy which empowers an 
individual to effect good in the world. For Coleridge, power is located in the apprehension of 
a reconciled self; when this is realised, it enables access to a magnifying union with nature 
and the divine, but when it is withheld, it diminishes perceptions of the self and the world to 
an almost unbearable degree.   
 Textual parallels can be used to interrogate divergences in attitudes to philosophical 
ideas; Kant’s philosophy, familiar to both Coleridge and Eliot, is a good example, and is used 
in the following discussions to elucidate their differing conceptions of a priori categories, 
moral responsibility and action, and the nature of self in the world. The nature of divergence 
between Coleridge and Eliot can be characterised as a progression towards a greater 
materiality of expression in Eliot. Her fiction demonstrates a realisation or reification of 
ideology through practical interactions between characters; Dinah comforts Lisbeth, Dorothea 
does her duty, Silas is redeemed by love and community. It is this materiality that is alluded 
to in my title: the convergences in language that are, simultaneously, divergences in outlook 
illustrate a progression in the ideas expressed, a development of meaning that I refer to as 
‘materialisation’. The meanings rendered by Coleridge’s language are materialised, made 
tangible and practical, in the transition from their manifestations in his poetry to their 
manifestations, often in the same language, in Eliot’s fiction.   
10 
 
Chapter One 
Self and the World: Affliction, Inspiration, and Duality 
There are close correspondences in the way that Coleridge and Eliot depict the pain of grief 
and loss; these occur at the level of language, as well as thematically. The state of mourning 
for a lost aspect of the self expressed in Coleridge’s ‘Dejection: An Ode’ is mirrored in 
descriptions of mourning in the account of Dinah’s visit to comfort Lisbeth in Adam Bede. 
Thematic links concerning the nature of affliction, lack of agency, and the defamiliarising 
effects of grief are reflected in the language used to describe these conditions. Sustained 
discourse on the location, experience and origin of inspiration informs Coleridge’s poem and 
Eliot’s descriptions of character. Clear parallels can be drawn between Coleridge’s conception 
of the soul’s ‘voice’ and power, and the personal presence and influence of Dinah, and 
fascinating correspondences between the portrayals of imagination in Coleridge and sympathy 
in Eliot point to shared perceptions, as well as areas of divergence. Although one of these 
points of divergence is their differing responses to Kantian philosophy, a close examination of 
the language used to address the issues of imagination and sympathy reveals surprising 
convergences as well.   
In ‘Dejection’, Coleridge presents his emotions through description of a natural world 
that expresses for him the agony of ‘grief without a pang, void, dark and drear’ (l. 21).15 The 
wind’s ‘dull sobbing draft’ ‘moans and rakes’ (l. 6), frustrating Coleridge’s desire for a 
                                                 
15 Whilst the identity of the speaker in poems is invariably a subject of contention, in the case of ‘Dejection’ it 
can be asserted that the emotions presented are Coleridge’s own. This is largely due to the history of the poem; 
originally conceived as ‘A Letter to ----- / April 4, 1802. -- Sunday Evening’, it was, in its initial form, an appeal 
to Sara Hutchinson for emotional comfort and the reciprocation of Coleridge’s sexual and romantic passion. The 
much-revised poem was subsequently published in The Morning Post, 4 October, 1802, and then in the 1817 
Sybilline Leaves and subsequent collections of Coleridge’s poetry. The many revisions of the poem, including 
changes in the name of the addressee, present a fascinating study in the reframing of intimate emotions for a 
public audience. 
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mighty storm that will inspire his awe and ‘startle [his] dull pain’ into a response that will 
‘move and live’ (l. 20). The sense of disempowerment expressed by Coleridge conveys his 
emotional disposition as subject to external elements, although he manipulates depiction of 
these in order to emphasise his feelings of powerlessness. By framing his emotional state as 
responsive to, rather than acting upon, his environment, he presents his ‘stifled, drowsy, 
unimpassioned grief’ (l. 22) as a ‘visitation’ (l. 84), over which he has no control.  
This sense of subjection – even abjection – is echoed by Eliot’s description of the 
‘overwhelming sense of pain’ experienced by Lisbeth on the death of her husband (p. 100). 
Lisbeth’s suffering, like Coleridge’s, is described as an ‘affliction’ (p. 100). Lisbeth breaks 
into ‘moans’ (p. 96), throws her apron over her head, and sways on her chair, ‘giving a low 
moan with every forward movement of her body’ (p. 99). Just as the ‘dull sobbing draft’ (l. 6) 
plays upon the strings of Coleridge’s ‘Eolian lute’ (l. 7), Lisbeth’s abjection is expressed in 
the air expelled from her body in moans. The image of being played upon by external forces 
that Coleridge encapsulates in the metaphor of the Eolian lute, is echoed in the image of 
Lisbeth’s body, whose moans are ‘played’ by the uncontrollable physical convulsions of her 
grief. Describing the way in which ‘grief in its freshness feels the need of associating its loss 
and its lament with every change of scene and incident’ (p. 98), Eliot further echoes 
Coleridge’s portrayal of his loss through its associations with the external world in the first 
stanza of ‘Dejection’.  
 Although Lisbeth’s outburst of ‘passion’ (p. 96) contrasts with Coleridge’s 
‘unimpassioned’ grief, Eliot’s description of the ‘blank eyes’ with which Lisbeth surveys the 
‘dirt and confusion’ (p. 95) of her kitchen parallels the grief described by Coleridge, who 
gazes at the western sky ‘with how blank an eye’ (l. 30). The sense that profound grief can 
rob the sufferer of both recognition of, and emotional response to, external circumstances 
informs both descriptions. It is notable that both Coleridge and Eliot depict the grief of loss in 
12 
 
a similarly contradictory way; both note the associations with the external world that 
stimulate and in some way manifest the grief for the griever, but both also observe the 
detachment with which the griever responds to external stimuli. The defamiliarising effects of 
grief so overwhelm the perceptions as to make the things of everyday life, whether a western 
sky or a disorganised kitchen, alien and distant, and the usual responses to them unobtainable.  
Eliot emphasises this process of defamiliarisation through the elaborate simile of the 
griever, as ‘one who has been deposited sleeping among the ruins of a vast city’, and who, on 
waking ‘in dreary amazement’, cannot make sense of the ‘desolation’ of his surroundings or 
of himself (p. 95). Not only does this mirror Coleridge’s ‘dark and drear’ (l. 21) grief, there is 
also an element of the uncanny in Eliot’s depiction of displacement; everything is 
transfigured, strange, and profoundly disturbing. The western sky, on which Coleridge has 
been gazing blankly, is similarly transfigured, with its ‘peculiar tint of yellow green’ (l. 29). 
The unnatural colour of the sky is ominous because it is alien; the alienation experienced by 
the gazer is expressed in Coleridge’s division between seeing and feeling, or responding to, 
the object of visual scrutiny: ‘I see, not feel’ (l. 38). Here, Coleridge is referring to the 
emerging stars above him, but the lack of connection, of seeing but not feeling ‘how beautiful 
they are’ (l. 38), is coloured by the defamiliarising effects of grief in a manner echoing the 
way that the night sky is made strange by its uncanny colour.  
Similarly uncanny properties inform Eliot’s description, in a previous chapter, of the 
meditative state in which Dinah receives divine inspiration, or ‘direction’ (p. 73). Dinah is 
insensible to her physical surroundings when in this state; as Mrs Poyser observes, she 
becomes like a statue, ‘a-starin’ and a-smilin’ whether it’s fair weather or foul’ (p. 73). 
Coleridge also stares, or gazes, at the western sky ‘[a]ll this long eve’ (l. 27), even though he 
accepts eventually the futility looking outwards for inspiration. This attitude of staring at, but 
not engaging with, physical surroundings renders both figures uncanny. Dinah’s outward stare 
13 
 
is the manifestation of all-consuming internal, mental processes; she is either a life-like statue, 
disturbing the boundaries between the animate and the inanimate, or a persistently staring and 
smiling person, whose inexplicable attitude disturbs the boundaries between sanity and 
insanity. The impression of non-human status ascribed to Dinah is reinforced when Lisbeth 
thinks, on hearing her voice and then seeing her face, first that she is the spirit of her dead 
sister, and then, perhaps, an angel (p. 99).  
Coleridge’s persistent gaze manifests in a similar way his preoccupation with internal 
processes – or with his lack of access to them. His unusually prolonged gazing at the ‘green 
light that lingers in the west’ (l. 44) links the unnatural colour of the sky with his actions, 
placing him on the borders of irrationality. But Coleridge’s staring is not merely unheimlich; 
his sense of estrangement in his surroundings also speaks of a more profound disconnection. 
The division between sensory perceptions and the capacity for understanding and interpreting 
them, as formulated by Kant, is discussed in more detail below; Coleridge’s familiarity with 
Kant suggests that his description of seeing but not feeling may allude to a schism at the most 
basic level of human response. As Coleridge puts it: ‘[b]y experience only I know, that I have 
eyes; but then my reason convinces me, that I must have had eyes in order to have the 
experience.’16 Is this inability to respond feelingly a separation from the understanding that 
contextualises and informs empirical evidence, as well as severance from the capacity for 
inspiration? The stasis linking Coleridge with Dinah indicates their inability to move 
outwards and engage, in Coleridge’s case, with his inspiration, but in Dinah’s, with other 
people and the natural processes going on around her. Both experience a schism, a radical 
                                                 
16 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, or, Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions, eds James 
Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton: Princeton University Press (Bollingen Series LXXV), 1984), vol. I, Ch. 
12, p. 293.  
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lack of connectedness, whose nature reflects the divergence between Coleridge’s 
preoccupation with subjective experience, and Eliot’s with material interaction.  
Both Coleridge and Eliot present the experience of inspiration as an internalised 
process, something taken inwards from outside, like breath. Both use similar language to 
describe this process, but also differentiate between the experience of inspiration and its 
source. Coleridge’s meditative gaze culminates in the conclusion that ‘I may not hope from 
outward forms to win / The passion and the life, whose fountains are within’ (ll. 45-6). The 
forms of the outward world are insufficient to start, or ‘startle’, his imaginative powers into 
life; he locates within himself that desperately sought-for, passionate engagement with his 
creativity. Paradoxically, he seeks self-estrangement, the shock of transformed perceptions of 
the world, to startle him into engagement, as an engine requires the spark of ignition for 
transmission to occur, but the outward spark is unobtainable. His language and phrasing here 
recall biblical language describing Christ as ‘the resurrection and the life’, and His suffering 
as passion.17 Biblical allusions like these contain implications of the original divine source, 
for Coleridge, of all creativity. It is apposite that he should describe his desire to re-engage 
with his creative imagination by allusion to John 11, in which Christ resurrects Lazarus from 
the dead; Coleridge’s separation from his capacity to experience inspiration is like death to 
him, and reinstatement of his imaginative faculties would represent a restoration to life. David 
Jasper observes that ‘the key to Coleridge’s particular understanding [of the divine] is his 
celebrated definition of the primary Imagination’:18  
The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all 
human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in 
the infinite I AM.19 
                                                 
17 John 11:25, King James version. 
18 David Jasper, The Sacred and Secular Canon in Romanticism: Preserving the Sacred Truths (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1999), p. 30. 
19 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. I, Ch. 13, p. 304. 
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Coleridge presents the primary imagination as the ‘prime Agent’, the most important shaping 
force in ‘all human Perception’. The word ‘Agent’ implies the active nature of the primary 
imagination; it mediates between ‘the finite mind’, limited by physical existence, and ‘the 
infinite I AM’, or the infinite source of consciousness, God.20 Coleridge identifies the primary 
imagination as a ‘living Power’, a vital quality inherent in human perception, which enables 
‘a repetition’, or reflection, in the finite terms of human consciousness, of ‘the eternal act of 
creation’, or the infinite nature of God. Therefore, when Coleridge locates the ‘fountains’ of 
inspiration within himself, he is not asserting Christ-like status or power, but attempting to 
describe the mystical experience of union with the Infinite I AM, and its effects upon the 
conscious mind. It is the loss of this connection that informs the emotional suffering 
expressed in ‘Dejection’. 
The language used by Eliot to describe Dinah’s experience of divine direction is 
remarkably similar to that used by Coleridge to convey the way in which he experiences 
inspiration. Coleridge’s ‘fountains’ are analogous with Dinah’s description of ‘the thought of 
God overflowing [her] soul’: ‘For thoughts are so great’, she observes, ‘They seem to lie upon 
us like a deep flood’ (p. 82). The overwhelming effect of inspiration / direction on the 
conscious mind is implicit in this watery imagery; the force of Coleridge’s fountains and the 
magnitude of Dinah’s flood both imply the impossibility of containing or controlling their 
experiences. Both evoke biblical language: these descriptions recall the original act of 
inspiration described in Genesis, when ‘the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the 
                                                 
20 The ‘infinite I AM’ refers to the passage in Exodus describing the revelation of God to Moses: ‘I AM THAT I 
AM’. Exodus 3: 14, King James version. 
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waters’.21 As well as reinforcing the religious nature of their imagery, this suggests a common 
source for some of the descriptive language used by Coleridge and Eliot.  
Eliot’s depiction of the character of Dinah corresponds closely to Coleridge’s 
descriptions of ‘the soul’ in stanza IV, and of the ‘pure of heart’ in stanza V of ‘Dejection’. 
Coleridge’s assertion that ‘we receive but what we give’ (l. 47) is reflected in Dinah’s 
selflessness. She states that ‘I seem to have no room in my soul for wants and fears of my 
own, it has pleased God to fill my heart so full of the wants and sufferings of his poor people’ 
(p. 33). For Coleridge, only ‘the soul’ (l.53) can restore anything ‘of higher worth’ (l. 50) to 
‘the poor, loveless, ever-anxious crowd’ (l. 52). Dinah is depicted by Eliot as that ideal soul, 
who, in language startlingly similar to Coleridge’s, brings comfort to ‘poor, aged, fretful 
Lisbeth’ (p. 104). The similarity of these three-adjective phrases illustrates the contrast 
between Eliot’s concrete, specific employment of such language and its general, oblique use 
in Coleridge. The transition from the ‘crowd’ in Coleridge to the character of Lisbeth 
personalises the expression by fixing it in description of an individual. Furthermore, the 
difference between ‘loveless’ to ‘ageing’ foregrounds Eliot’s preoccupation with organic, 
material processes. The ‘sweet and potent voice’ (l. 57) of the soul is mirrored in ‘the 
soothing influence of Dinah’s face and voice’ (p. 104) on Lisbeth. The ‘voice’ in Coleridge is 
represented as an individual voice in Eliot, in a process of definition that materialises the 
transcendent concept in the terms of human action and interaction. The ‘power’ (l.63) 
attributed by Coleridge to ‘that voice’ (l. 74) corresponds closely to Eliot’s delineation of the 
power of Dinah’s influence on those around her. Human, tangible, interactive influence, 
rather than the internalised, conceptual power of the non-material characterises Eliot’s 
presentation – or re-presentation – of ‘voice’. The ‘Joy’ (ll. 64, 66, 70) that for Coleridge 
                                                 
21 Genesis 1: 2, King James version. 
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emanates from, and characterises, the ‘strong music in the soul’ (l. 60) is reflected, in Eliot, in 
‘the joy of being with Dinah’, which ‘would triumph: it was like the influence of climate, 
which no resistance can overcome’ (p. 101).  
It is striking that both of these sentiments concerning joy, and its power, are 
attributable to feelings of romantic love: Coleridge’s for the original addressee of ‘Dejection’, 
and Seth’s for Dinah. Both women evoke admiration, even adoration, which inspires 
transcendent thought and expression. Seth believes Dinah to be ‘greater and better than 
himself’ (p. 34); Eliot’s narrator comments that ‘[l]ove of this sort is hardly distinguishable 
from religious feeling’ (p. 34). For Coleridge, the ‘Joy’ experienced by the beloved, whose 
virtue, purity and humility render it innate in her, also has religious dimensions. The 
characteristics of ‘Joy’ – a ‘light’, a ‘glory’, a ‘fair luminous cloud / mist’ (ll. 54 and 62) are 
redolent of depictions of saints. For Eliot, saintliness is commensurate with selflessness like 
Dinah’s, and for her the selfless act, in a succinct refraction of Coleridge’s more nebulous 
characterisation, ‘has a beneficent radiation that is not lost’ (p. 35). Eliot’s narrative 
comments on selflessness diverge slightly from Coleridge’s; it is the act, rather than the actor, 
that is the agent of the soul’s magnification, and this divergence is a further example of the re-
presentation of the concept in more tangible, material terms. The diffusive power, or 
‘radiation’, that Eliot attributes to the act, however, expands it beyond the material fact of its 
occurrence, and attributes to it characteristics more akin to the ‘suffusion’ perceived by 
Coleridge (l. 75).  
Tragically, all of Coleridge’s assertions in ‘Dejection’ concerning joy and its uplifting 
power are equivocal and conditional, because he cannot hear his soul’s music, despite his 
repeated, projected ‘we’. He presents his addressee as the ideal, who may be able to mediate 
this ‘voice’ by possessing the qualities necessary to attain ‘the spirit and the power, / Which 
wedding Nature to us gives in dower’ (ll. 67-8). That mediation is necessary, because his own 
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ability to apprehend ‘the spirit and the power’ is incomplete, fractured by the suspension of 
‘what nature gave me at my birth, / My shaping spirit of Imagination’ (ll. 85-6).  
The way in which Coleridge experiences inspiration as a conscious response to 
apprehension of the infinite identifies that response as an inner process, as discussed above; 
but the source of his inspiration, the force that is the wellspring of those inner fountains, lies 
outside his consciousness. The idea that ‘nature’ bestows upon humanity the capacity for 
receiving inspiration proposes an external source for this capacity; the primary imagination is, 
for Coleridge, the necessary faculty for reception of the inspiration that reaches into the finite 
consciousness from without. It is interesting that the word ‘affliction’, singular in Eliot, and 
plural in Coleridge, is used to describe the suffering experienced by both himself and Lisbeth: 
Coleridge’s ‘afflictions bow [him] down to earth’ (l. 82), and Dinah acknowledges that 
Lisbeth’s ‘affliction is great’ (p. 100). ‘Affliction’ can describe both the cause and the 
experience of pain; its use indicates an acknowledgement in both writers of the dual nature of 
experience. Each could have used the word ‘suffering’ without loss of meaning, but 
‘affliction’ carries the implication of something originating from an external source, as well as 
its manifestation in the emotional experience of the afflicted. In Eliot, the external source is 
an event – the death of Thias – but in Coleridge, the ‘visitation’ (l. 84) of his afflictions occurs 
at the level of consciousness.  
Many critics have identified Coleridge’s response to the natural world as the stimulus 
for his ‘shaping spirit of Imagination’, but ‘Dejection’ problematizes this interpretation.22 The 
‘outward forms’ of nature are not the source of the ‘passion and the life’ of the imagination; 
rather, the ‘afflictions’ that ‘bow [Coleridge] down to earth’ describe a mental condition in 
                                                 
22 Nicholas Reid, for example, notes Coleridge’s preoccupation ‘with the world as embodiment of the divine 
mythos’ (Coleridge, Form and Symbol, Or The Ascertaining Vision (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 63); Jean-
Pierre Mileur argues that Coleridge ‘imaginatively transforms nature into the eternal language of God’ (Vision 
and Revision: Coleridge’s Art of Immanence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 53). 
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which the consciousness is severed from apprehension of the infinite and limited to 
perception of the forms of the material world, rather than the immanence of the infinite within 
them. ‘Dejection’s’ dialogue with Wordsworth’s ‘Immortality Ode’, especially its opening 
stanzas, is critically established; William A. Ulmer calls them ‘the “Allegro” and “Penseroso” 
of romantic literature.’23 Critical consensus identifies the oppositional nature of Wordsworth’s 
location and apprehension of nature’s ‘celestial light’ in the perceptions of childhood, and 
Coleridge’s belief that this faculty may be sustained into adulthood, but, crucially, only in the 
perceptions of the undivided self.24 Wordsworth’s considerable influence on Eliot’s writing is, 
as has been noted previously, well-established. Language links between the ‘Immortality 
Ode’, ‘Dejection’, and Adam Bede thus create an oblique bridging effect between 
Wordsworthian Eliot, Wordsworth, and Coleridge.  
When Coleridge proposes that ‘[w]e in ourselves rejoice’ (l. 72), he refers to the whole 
and undivided self, whose perceptions inform the sensory experience of the world; without 
the source, there can be no experience, no ‘charm’ in the world, and nothing to ‘suffuse’ with 
‘light’ the materiality of experience (ll. 73 and 75). How, then, is Coleridge able to create 
poetry that so poignantly expresses his lack of connection with the source of his inspiration? 
Perhaps the answer is to be found in his formulation of the ‘secondary imagination’. 
Described as ‘an echo of the former, coexisting with the conscious will, yet still as identical 
with the primary in the kind of its agency’, the secondary imagination is, for Coleridge, a 
further reflection, or ‘echo’ of the infinite, and therefore represents the same type, or ‘kind’ of 
experience.25 It differs from the primary imagination, or direct reflection of the infinite, ‘only 
                                                 
23 William A. Ulmer, ‘Radical Similarity: Wordsworth, Coleridge and the Dejection Dialogue’, English Literary 
History 76: 1 (2009), pp. 189-213, (p. 193). 
24 William Wordsworth, ‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollection of Early Childhood’, in The Major 
Works, ed. Stephen Gill (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp. 297-302, l. 4. 
25 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 304. 
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in degree, and in the mode of its operation’26. The ‘degree’ of difference is alluded to by the 
word ‘echo’; this reflection is slightly less distinct than that of the primary imagination. The 
‘mode of […] operation’ refers to the coexistence of the secondary imagination ‘with the 
conscious will’, which shapes or moulds its expression, and is linked inextricably with it. 
Coleridge asserts that the secondary imagination ‘dissolves, diffuses, [and] dissipates, in order 
to recreate’, thus delineating the process whereby ‘repetition’ of the infinite is made 
expressible in human terms by its progress through the creative imagination, which has the 
ability to ‘recreate’ it in the concrete, communicable medium of language.27 If, then, 
Coleridge is cut off from his primary imagination, he still possesses the echoes of the original 
experience, through memory and acts of will, that enable him to reproduce the original 
experience, now diffused and dissipated in his consciousness.   
This distinction between the experience and the source of inspiration, and between its 
reception and reproduction, has been discussed at length, because – despite her assertions 
concerning the primacy of the ‘observations of the senses’ – Eliot shares Coleridge’s 
conclusions concerning the external source of inspiration.28 Dinah’s reception of divine 
direction ensures that ‘she was never left to herself; but it was always given to her when to 
keep silence and when to speak’ (p. 104). In a further narrative intervention, Eliot states 
explicitly her conclusions regarding the source of ‘inspiration’: 
And do we not all agree to call rapid thought and noble impulse by the name of 
inspiration? After our subtlest analysis of the mental process, we must still say, as 
Dinah did, that our highest thoughts and our best deeds are all given to us (p. 104). 
 
There are striking parallels between Eliot’s comments and Coleridge’s assertion that his 
‘shaping spirit of Imagination’ is something ‘given’ to, or bestowed upon him. Coleridge’s 
                                                 
26 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 304. 
27 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, p. 304. 
28 George Eliot, Essays of George Eliot, ed. Thomas Pinney, cited in Ashton, The German Idea, p. 151. 
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subtle analysis of his own mental process may be problematized by his identification of 
‘nature’ as the giver of his shaping spirit; however, his repetition of ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ 
point to an extremely complex use of these terms. He is not referring to organic processes, for 
example, when he writes of ‘wedding Nature to us’ (l. 68); this construction of ‘nature’ seems 
to refer to the sense of wholeness and reconciliation of different aspects of consciousness that 
enable the apprehension of ‘[a] new Earth and a new Heaven’ (l. 69), a transformative 
experience conjoining human perceptions with the infinite.29 Eliot, conversely, uses ‘nature’ 
and ‘natural’ to differentiate sensory experience from that which is supernatural, or involves 
the transcendent element of consciousness discussed by Coleridge. Describing Adam’s 
premonitory experience of the ‘stroke with the willow wand’ that augurs the death of his 
father, Eliot is concerned to present the story ‘as he told it, not attempting to reduce it to its 
natural elements: in our eagerness to explain impressions, we often lose our hold of the 
sympathy that comprehends them’ (p. 46). There is a clear division here between the 
reductive ‘natural elements’ that explain phenomena in strictly empirical terms, and the 
(presumably) non-material factor of ‘sympathy’ that enables comprehension of the idea. This 
narrative comment aligns Eliot’s concept of ‘sympathy’ with other non-material processes, 
such as ‘direction’, and also with Coleridge’s concepts of inspiration and the faculty of 
‘Imagination’. 
This way of thinking about non-material faculties and processes can be identified as 
Kantian in nature. Kant proposed that we must have the raw materials of knowledge in our 
sensory perceptions, or experience, of the world, but that we can only think about and 
organise them by applying a priori categories of knowledge. He formulated a distinction 
                                                 
29 Biblical references to the ‘new Earth’ and ‘new Heaven(s)’, promised to God’s faithful, could be seen as 
informing Coleridge’s formulations of the creative imagination, because this faculty enables apprehension of 
‘the infinite I AM’ (i.e. God). Isaiah 65: 17 and 66: 22; 2 Peter 3: 13; Revelation 21: 1, all King James version. 
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between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ a priori truths; the first, as Roger Scruton observes, are 
self-evident propositions, such as ‘all bachelors are unmarried’, but the second are 
propositions, such as ‘every event has a cause’, that ‘cannot be established through 
experience, since their truth is presupposed in the interpretation of experience’.30 Synthetic a 
priori categories, argues Scruton, are ‘not just true on this or that occasion, but universally and 
necessarily.31 The word ‘transcendental’ is used by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason to 
refer to all discourse that exceeds, or transcends, empirical observation, and Kant’s 
‘transcendental idealism’ is the theory of applying a priori categories of understanding to 
experience. Or, as Coleridge puts it: ‘We learn all things indeed by occasion of experience; 
but the very facts so learnt force us inward on the antecedents, that must be pre-supposed in 
order to render experience possible.’32 Eliot expresses dissatisfaction with Kant’s theories, 
and in particular with the idea of the universality and necessity of synthetic a priori categories 
as a mode of understanding, arguing in 1855 that:  
to deduce knowledge from them alone, and to make them a standing point higher than 
all experience […] is an attempt to poise the universe on one’s head, and no wonder if 
dizziness and delusion are the consequence.33 
 
What Eliot seems to overlook here is the inextricable relationship, in Kant’s transcendental 
idealism, between experience and reason. Yet, if ‘sympathy’ is not itself a kind of priori 
category that enables comprehension of experience, Eliot’s assertions concerning its centrality 
to human understanding appear problematic. If ‘our highest thoughts and our best deeds are 
all given to us’, the ‘giving’ must precede the experience of thinking and doing them, as well 
as being inextricable from them. Eliot’s ‘sympathy’ diverges from Coleridge’s ‘Imagination’ 
                                                 
30 Roger Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p. 28. 
31 Roger Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction, pp. 30-31. 
32 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Vol. I, Ch. 9, p. 142. 
33 George Eliot, Essays of George Eliot, ed. Thomas Pinney, cited in Ashton, The German Idea, p. 151.  
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in one crucial way: it is indivisible from human interaction. Thus, a quality rendered allusive 
and transcendental in Coleridge is expressed by Eliot as material, contained and observable. 
Dinah’s character, and her actions, function as a vehicle for the abstract concept of sympathy, 
and enable Eliot to demonstrate its enactment on a material level.  
The sense of isolation expressed in ‘Dejection’ is an expression of yearning for the 
absent beloved, but also, and primarily, of a division of the unified self, without which no 
kind of interaction – either with the infinite or with others – is possible for Coleridge. He 
attempts to regain his ‘natural’ capacity for oneness within himself by accessing his 
imagination; that this is his ‘sole resource’, and his ‘only plan’ (l. 91) emphasises his solitude, 
and the impossibility of aid originating in the actions of any other person. He tries to 
apprehend and access, through intellectual endeavour, or ‘abstruse research’ (l. 89), his 
suspended imagination. The imagery of splitting and fragmentation within the self is extended 
in his description of that ‘part’, the controlled and conscious mind, ‘infect[ing] the whole’ (l. 
92). It is as though the self must first be broken down in order to reconcile its disparate and 
unobtainable parts in a cohesive whole. His observation that this process has ‘now […] almost 
grown the habit of my soul’ (l. 93) conveys the way in which the resource of the intellect has 
‘almost’ become his only, or ‘sole’, means of accessing the ‘natural man’ that existed before 
the fragmentation. Thus, he attempts, paradoxically, to regain wholeness through a further 
process of splitting, which has almost become habitual, but also, in an alternative 
construction, has become a ‘habit’ – a cover, cloak, or concealment – of his undivided self. In 
Adam Bede, Lisbeth’s sense of isolation is caused by the loss of another person; this 
construction of the concept of division roots it in the external world of individuals and events. 
Emphasis is placed on this materiality by Eliot’s depiction of the comforting influence of 
Dinah, whose power resides in her physical presence and practical acts. Both the cause and 
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the healing of the division are located by Eliot outside the self, in the world of human 
interaction. 
 When Coleridge writes of the ‘little child / Upon a lonesome wild’ who ‘screams loud, 
and hopes to make her mother hear’ (ll.121-5), his identification with the isolated and helpless 
being is both affecting and affected. His verse has, by this point, acquired the tone and the 
tropes of sentimentality, and his expression of anguish has receded into a less immediate, 
more de-personalised representation that fails to convince as completely as the preceding 
parts of the poem. It is slightly uncanny that the image used to depict the lost soul, and the 
lost soul’s voice, is repeated so tragically in Adam Bede. Hetty’s abandoned child is, however, 
not the focus of Eliot’s concern; rather, it is the abandoning mother who occupies the textual 
space, and the crying child is the textual device allowing Eliot to return to the extended 
meditation on human interaction and influence informing Adam Bede. The points at which 
Eliot and Coleridge diverge, discussed in my introduction, centre on the distinctions between 
isolated and interactive human thought and endeavour; between the ‘shaping’ and the 
‘subduing’ spirit; between the power of the reconciled self and the reconciling power of 
influence. These areas of divergence epitomise the way in which Eliot materialises ideas 
presented as transcendent in Coleridge.  
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Chapter Two 
The Uses of Silence: Solitude, Society and Morality 
The motif of silence is used repeatedly to signal, in Coleridge, isolation, self-contemplation, 
and intellectual freedom, and in Eliot, communication and its restriction, the influence of 
others, and the effects of causality. Differing presentations and uses of silence are predicated 
to a substantial extent on divergences in formulations of organicism. The distinctions between 
Coleridge’s and Eliot’s organicism are illustrated in their depictions of the self in relation to 
wider society. The historical separation between the social structures discussed by each writer 
makes correspondences in the language used to describe them even more remarkable. The 
language of invasion is used by both Coleridge and Eliot to address the power and extent of 
personal agency, and to explore relationships between individuals. Analysis of the contrasting 
approaches to materiality in Coleridge and Eliot reveals potential reasons for their divergent 
responses to Kant’s categorical imperative, as well as further oppositions between theoretical 
and practical solutions to questions of the individual’s moral responsibility.  
The ‘spirit-healing nook’ in which Coleridge composes his meditation on his 
‘countrymen’ in ‘Fears in Solitude’ is characterised by its stillness and silence.34 It is a ‘green 
and silent spot’ (l. 1), suffused with the ‘[s]weet influences’ (l. 21) of nature; but this is nature 
at its most benign. Coleridge’s ‘solitude’ (l. 19) is secured and reinforced by the silence and 
stillness surrounding him, which enable his self-contemplation. It is paradoxical, then, that his 
‘meditative joy’ (l. 23) is presented in the third person, as that of a ‘humble man’ (l. 14), who 
has ‘found / Religious meanings in the forms of nature’ (l. 24). In Kantian terms, he is 
regarding himself as both ‘noumenon’, or ‘thing-in-itself’, and ‘phenomenon’, or object, 
                                                 
34 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘Fears in Solitude’, pp. 239-244, ll. 12, 41. All further references will be given in 
the body of the text. 
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which is part of the empirical world; it is this two-fold self-perception that informs his 
relationship with his natural environment.  
Kant’s proposition that every change that occurs in nature has a cause, but that the 
originating self is distinct from, and independent of, causal necessity appears contradictory. 
His solution to this ‘antinomy of freedom’ was an extension of the central paradox of being: 
the law of cause and effect operates only in nature, the empirical realm; but freedom, the idea 
that ‘I’ originate thought and action, is located in the transcendental realm of consciousness, 
or reason. Therefore, ‘I’ exist both in nature and in the realm of conscious self-perception, as 
both ‘phenomenon’ and ‘noumenon’.35 Coleridge was to return to, and reinterpret, Kant’s 
ideas and categories, particularly those of the understanding and the reason to which 
‘phenomenon’ and ‘noumenon’ pertain, throughout his life. His organicism centres on a 
perception of himself as part of nature and, simultaneously, as an individuated non-material 
self whose will originates his actions. 
Coleridge’s projection of himself into the third person is a manifestation of the act of 
self-contemplation. His knowledge of the natural world, in Kantian terms, guarantees the 
existence of the ‘I’ that knows it, and his presentation in third-person terms of the unity of 
consciousness that allows him to think is both paradoxical and illustrative: he is observing in 
himself the process of contemplation. This is the philosophical basis for the splitting effect 
often conveyed in Coleridge’s meditations on the nature of self. But what factor prompts this 
examination in ‘Fears in Solitude’? Repeated references to the silence surrounding him in the 
opening movement of the poem suggest the centrality of silence to the meditative state. The 
sense of solitude necessary for self-reflection is fostered by silence, and it is the silence of the 
physically isolated place, rather than its remoteness, that crystallises the perception of his 
                                                 
35 Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction, pp. 74-5. 
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unity of consciousness for Coleridge. The motif of silence functions as a focus for self-
consciousness, and all other perceptions are contingent upon it. The forms of nature are 
observed, but do not intrude into the silence; this allows Coleridge to project religious 
meanings on to them as an adjunct of consciousness.  
Silence often functions as a point of origin for explorations of consciousness in 
Coleridge’s poetry. It prompts and facilitates self-examination, and the expression of 
responses to the questions: ‘who am I?’; ‘how do I feel?’; ‘how can I describe myself in the 
world?’ Silence is also a recurring motif in Eliot’s fiction, but instead of opening up self-
expression, she often uses it to connote suppression of feeling. Although Eliot often depicts 
solitude as a catalyst for self-realisation, her uses of silence are predominantly regulatory in 
nature. All of the principal characters in Middlemarch are described as ‘silent’ at least once, 
and their silence is conditioned by an inability or disinclination to speak their feelings and 
responses. For example, when Rosamond Vincy is interrogated by her aunt concerning 
Lydgate’s intentions towards her, her silence twice masks ‘feelings’ that are ‘very 
unpleasant’: ‘Her pride was hurt, but her habitual control of manner helped her. “Pray excuse 
me, aunt. I would rather not speak on the subject”’ (p. 278). Experiencing ‘much 
mortification’, she once again chooses ‘to be silent’ (p. 279). Here, silence regulates the 
expression of the confusion and shame occasioned by her assumptions concerning Lydgate’s 
affection for her. Eliot’s portrayal of Rosamond is famously unsympathetic, and the latter’s 
discomfort may be intended as a source of vicarious malicious enjoyment; but it is not only 
the unsympathetic characters in Middlemarch whose feelings are regulated by silence.  
When Farebrother presents Fred Vincy’s suit to Mary Garth, he is ‘silent for a minute 
or more’ after her conditional rebuttal of Fred’s hopes (p. 486). Because Farebrother is 
himself in love with Mary, his silence suppresses a declaration of his own feelings; when he is 
able to speak, it is with ‘grave restrained emotion’ (p. 486). When Mary is ‘in her turn […] 
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silent, wondering not at Mr Farebrother’s manner but at his tone’ (p. 486), she is suppressing 
a response to her perception of Farebrother’s feelings for her. The role of duty, which will be 
discussed further, plays a large part in this suppression of feelings and, therefore, in the 
silence of both characters. Farebrother has ‘gone magnanimously through a duty’ (p. 487) that 
has caused him great emotional distress; Mary speaks her mind only because he convinces her 
that it is her duty to do so. Yet, she senses in Farebrother’s manner what the silence between 
them signifies: ‘something like the resolute suppression of a pain’ (p. 487).  
The uses of silence in Eliot and Coleridge illustrate the points of divergence identified 
in the previous chapter. Silence intensifies the isolation necessary for Coleridge to explore his 
creative process, while in Eliot it pertains to the processes of interaction between characters. 
For Coleridge, silence has a shaping quality, in that it conditions his responses to his material 
environment; Eliot uses silence to subdue strong emotions and create a barrier to their 
expression. In silence, Coleridge is able to access the power of his imagination, which is 
experienced within the self; silence in Eliot is aligned with the power of influence, because 
the influence of one character upon another often imposes silence, and prevents the 
expression of feeling. Of course, these divergences are informed by the differing modes of 
expression used by Coleridge and Eliot. The silence of isolation is necessary for Coleridge to 
have the conversation with himself that forms his poetic expression; the narrative structure of 
Eliot’s prose is dependent upon interaction between characters, and silence is one component 
of that interaction, albeit one that inhibits and restricts, rather than allows, expression. 
Coleridge’s silence is the silence of nature, over which he has no control; he does not 
condition his environment, only his responses to it. In Kantian terms, causal necessity denies 
his freedom, but practical reason insists upon it. Eliot’s silence is elective, rather than 
imposed from without, and belongs primarily to the realm of consciousness. The lack of 
expression occasioned by the silence of her characters informs narrative suspense, because the 
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reader is aware, through descriptive narrative interventions, of what her characters do not say, 
and why.  
 Occasionally, Eliot uses silence not only to suppress, but also to attenuate feelings too 
painful to express, as when Harriet Bulstrode comforts her husband in his disgrace: 
They could not speak to each other of the shame which she was bearing with him, or 
of the acts which had brought it down on them. His confession was silent, and her 
promise of faithfulness was silent. Open-minded as she was, she nevertheless shrank 
from the words which would have expressed their mutual consciousness, as she would 
have shrunk from flakes of fire (p. 707). 
 
The suppression of mutual feelings of shame is consonant with Eliot’s strategic use of silence, 
but the confession and the promise have a religious quality corresponding to the ‘spirit-
healing’ (l. 12) nature of Coleridge’s ‘green and silent spot’ (l. 1). The comfort derived by 
husband and wife from what is not said foregrounds an aspect of silence in Eliot more 
correlative to its the presentation in ‘Fears in Solitude’. Mrs Bulstrode’s deep aversion to 
speaking the subject of ‘their mutual consciousness’ has parallels in Coleridge’s anguished 
consciousness of the suffering that lies beyond the silence enclosing him:  
My God! it is a melancholy thing  
For such a man, who would full fain preserve  
His soul in calmness, yet perforce must feel  
For all his human brethren’ (ll. 29-32).  
 
There is something beyond the silence that threatens to overwhelm and destroy. Both 
Coleridge and Eliot use the same word to describe it: the roar. 
 Eliot’s celebrated formulation of ‘the roar which lies on the other side of silence’ (p. 
182) mirrors the ‘uproar’ (l. 33) that, for Coleridge, ‘weighs upon the heart’ (l. 33); both are 
evinced, in Eliot conditionally so, by ‘a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life’ (p. 
182). Silence is the element preventing the incursion of chaos into the consciousness. 
Coleridge’s ‘uproar’ describes human events that may be occurring outside the encircling 
silence of the dell, but the movement from self-reflection within this comforting boundary to 
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contemplation of what lies beyond is signalled by a change in consciousness, from looking 
inwards to looking outwards. Eliot’s description posits a similar change in consciousness, 
from the ‘stupidity’ (p. 182) of egocentric perceptions to an overwhelming acuteness of 
sensibility, or sympathy, which recognises the suffering of others. Eliot’s speculation that ‘we 
should die of [that] roar’ (p. 182) mirrors Coleridge’s fervent wish that the fearful incursion 
should pass ‘like the gust, that roared and died away’ (l. 200).  
 Christopher Stokes notes the paradox that emerges in ‘Fears in Solitude’, between 
Coleridge’s ‘desire to stand outside society, […] and a contradictory desire to enter the public 
sphere’.36 These contradictory desires are reflected in the poem’s movement from private 
contemplation to contemplation of wider society, social structures, and the vicissitudes of 
war. Stokes comments on the way in which the sounds envisaged – the ‘thunder and the shout 
/ And all the crash of onset; fear and rage’ – function as voices ‘[t]earing at the borders of the 
reflective retreat’.37 Ben Brice argues that Coleridge’s description of the ‘undetermined 
conflict’ creates a sense of ‘an unnervingly contingent present’.38 The contingency of external 
events is echoed in a sense of threat to the unified self. The multitudinous nature of the world 
of men is emphasised repeatedly, and couched in the language of condemnation is a fear of 
that which ‘murders the whole man’ (l. 52), or destroys the unified self. The organs of state, 
‘courts, committees, institutions’, engulf all ‘dignity and power’ (ll. 54-5); the power of the 
self to survive within societal structures seems to be constantly in question. Coleridge’s 
organicism, his perception of himself as part of the natural world, of ‘native Britain’, his 
‘Mother Isle’ (l. 182), fails to extend to his relationship with society, despite the repeated ‘us’ 
and ‘we’ of this section of the poem. 
                                                 
36 Christopher Stokes, Coleridge, Language and the Sublime: From Transcendence to Finitude (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 39. 
37 Stokes, Coleridge, Language and the Sublime, p. 44. 
38 Ben Brice, Coleridge and Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 129-130. 
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 Eliot’s organicism, unsurprisingly, focuses on the relationships between individuals 
comprising the social system in a reciprocal relationship whereby they condition and are in 
turn conditioned by their cultural environment. While Coleridge portrays wider social 
structures as negative, implicitly corrupt and essentially static in ‘Fears in Solitude’, Eliot 
writes persuasively in Middlemarch of the ‘constantly shifting […] boundaries of social 
intercourse [which are] begetting new consciousness of interdependence’ (p. 88). Social 
structures are portrayed as positive, organic, and active in their capacity to both form and be 
formed by the individuals they contain. This divergence in outlook is also a separation in 
time; earlier traditions of organicism were based on models that Tim Dolin calls ‘anti-
rationalist’, in the sense of being impervious to investigation through the faculty of reason.39 
This tradition of organicism favoured metaphysical interpretations, in which the relationship 
of individual souls with the divine superseded any human interaction or organisation. 
Coleridge’s perception of the organic nature of the world was thus predicated on the 
interconnectedness of all living things through their relationship with the divine, and the 
immanence of God within them. For later nineteenth-century writers like Eliot, Dolin argues, 
advances in earth sciences and evolutionary theory ‘had demonstrated the essential unity of 
life forms and organic systems’ in a way that could be applied to social organisms.40 The 
effect of rationalist thought for writers of Eliot’s generation was to undermine the idea that an 
individual could be separate from his or her social environment. Coleridge’s portrayal of the 
moral turpitude of his society in ‘Fears in Solitude’ rejects implicitly the model of social 
organisation as a reciprocal process; the idea that social structures might be subject to 
empirical laws of cause and effect challenges the authority of the originating ‘I’ of the 
individual will.  
                                                 
39 Dolin, George Eliot, p. 201. 
40 Dolin, George Eliot, p. 201. 
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 The divergence in Eliot and Coleridge’s views on society is implicit in their 
descriptions of civic institutions. Coleridge proposes that ‘individual dignity and power [is] / 
Engulfed in ‘courts, committees, institutions, / Associations and societies’ (ll. 54-6), as 
though these forms of social organisation become alien entities separate from, and threatening 
to, the individuals comprising them. This threat is characterised as a force of nature; it 
engulfs, swallows up, and thereby obliterates, like a flood or an earthquake. Eliot’s 
description of the evolution of societal structures uses similar imagery; individuals are ‘caught 
in […] currents’, some ‘political’ in nature, and some ‘ecclesiastical’ (p. 88). These currents 
overwhelm the individuals caught up in them as irresistibly as Coleridge’s engulfing 
institutions, but they are not threatening. Their power of containment does not obliterate, but 
instead carries along; they are moving and vital, rather than deadly. Eliot extends her 
metaphor to allude the ‘few personages or families’ who stand ‘with rocky firmness amid all 
this fluctuation’ (p. 88); individual resistance is futile, and ‘in spite of solidity’, they are 
‘slowly presenting new aspects’ (p. 88), like rock worn away by water.  
The passage in Middlemarch in which these observations appear is concerned 
primarily with the nature of change in society, and presents distinct contrasts between the old 
and the new. ‘Old provincial society’ (p. 88) – the society to which Coleridge belonged when 
he wrote ‘Fears in Solitude’ – is portrayed by Eliot as something gradually eroded and 
replaced by new perceptions of persons and place. But in delineating the development of  
‘civic mind’ (p. 88) in provincial England, Eliot is drawing on research into the period, rather 
than personal recollection; the action of Middlemarch takes place between 1829 and 1832, 
when she was still a young girl. There are close correspondences between her depiction of the 
old social structures and Coleridge’s perception of them, not only in terms of their stasis and 
solidity, but also in the language and imagery used to describe them. Coleridge’s portrayal of 
social corruption uses the imagery of Christian worship; those with power in his society ‘have 
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drunk up, demure as at a grace, / Pollutions from the brimming cup of wealth’ (ll. 59-60). He 
rails against the way that ‘freedom and the poor man’s life’ are bartered ‘[f]or gold, as at a 
market’ (ll. 62-3). Eliot also draws parallels between financial and religious degeneracy in her 
description of the ‘worship of the solar guinea’ (p. 88) prevalent in old society. She goes on to 
foreground one of the fundamental influences in changing perceptions between her own and 
Coleridge’s society when she observes that this ‘worship’ has ‘become extinct’ (p. 88). Here, 
language aligning religious structures with vested financial interests is inflected by language 
describing, in the terminology of evolutionary theory, the manner in which the old has been 
superseded by the new.  
What Coleridge sees as the power of the individual to effect change, Eliot formulates 
as a contingent human capacity. In one of her prefatory dialogues, she makes explicit her 
views on power and personal agency:  
 1st Gent. Where lies the power, there let the blame lie too. 
 2nd Gent. Nay, power is relative; you cannot fright  
     The coming pest with border fortresses, 
     […] All force is twain in one: cause is not cause 
     Unless effect be there; and action’s self 
     Must needs contain a passive (p. 608). 
 
Eliot engages with Kantian arguments concerning cause and effect, extending empirical laws 
to embrace human endeavour. K. M. Newton sees Eliot’s affirmation of relativism in 
Middlemarch as part of her attack on ‘the egotism and social alienation associated with the 
Romantics’; indeed, the divergence between  Coleridge’s perception of personal freedom and 
Eliot’s philosophy of social interdependence could not be formulated more clearly than it is 
here.41 Where Coleridge distinguishes between the force of individual will and its external 
effects, Eliot contends that both are subject to the law of cause and effect. It is notable that 
                                                 
41 K. M. Newton, George Eliot, Romantic Humanist, p. 123. 
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both use the language of invasion and borders to discuss the extent of personal agency and the 
influence of human interaction. The feared invasion of ‘Fears in Solitude’ is also an incursion 
into Coleridge’s sense of personal freedom; Eliot argues that any perceived division between 
the self and others is ineffectual, because it is illusory. All force is ‘twain in one’, rather than 
divisible into self and other; for her, no action can possibly be isolated from its effect upon 
others, or from its originating cause outside the self.  
 How, then, can the individual take responsibility for moral action in Eliot’s 
formulation? In Kantian terms, the transcendental freedom implicit in the ‘I’ of consciousness 
allows us to deliberate and act, but freedom is not independent of the world in which it exists; 
rather, it defines the limits of our perspective on the empirical world.42 Coleridge and Eliot 
differ in their perceptions of the extent to which this perspective is conditioned by causal 
explanations. For Coleridge, as for Kant, actions are only free if they involve an autonomous 
will, which privileges individual freedom over the causality of nature, and reason over desire, 
self-interest, and other empirical conditions. Kant’s proposal that the autonomy of the will is 
the sole principle of all the moral laws, and of all duties which conform to them, finds echoes 
in both Coleridge and Eliot. The categorical imperative proposed by Kant assumes that there 
is only one principle guiding the autonomous will; based on reason alone, this principle must 
be abstracted from all other conditions that circumscribe rational agents and their actions. It is 
universal in nature, but specific in its implementation, because it legislates behaviour. Kant’s 
famous formulation of the categorical imperative is his ‘golden rule’: that we should do as we 
would be done by.43 Neither Coleridge or Eliot disagree fundamentally with the golden rule; 
they diverge in their beliefs concerning the extent to which reason alone can determine 
                                                 
42 Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction, pp. 76-77. 
43 Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction, pp. 80-86. 
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decisions and actions, and moral actions are independent of causality. Put simply, when 
people act morally (rather than empirically) their actions have both causes and reasons. Eliot 
believes that morality can be commanded by duty, as an external, legislating cause, and 
Coleridge believes that morality emanates from an innate sense of duty that is based on reason 
alone. The distinction may seem fine, but it is central to divergences in their respective 
understanding and presentation of moral agency and the way in which individuals engage 
with the world.   
 Once again, the uses of silence in Coleridge and Eliot can provide a way into their 
divergent outlooks on the function of individual actions and their moral dimensions. The 
‘strange / And extreme silentness’ (ll. 9-10) of Coleridge’s environment in the opening stanza 
of ‘Frost at Midnight’ ‘vexes meditation’ (l. 9). This seems contradictory in the light of 
previous assertions concerning the necessity of silence for self-contemplation in Coleridge’s 
work. But this silence, this ‘hush of nature’ (l. 17), is too extreme; there is no ambient natural 
sound to facilitate the inward journey. Instead, the silence promotes a sense of the uncanny, 
because it creates a separation from the natural, as well as the human, world. Usually, silence 
would ‘suit[s] / Abstruser musings’ (ll. 5-6), but this uncanny calmness provokes the startled 
reflection that what is outside, ‘[s]ea, hill, and wood, / This populous village!’ (ll. 10-11) may 
not exist, because they are not visually or audibly perceptible. The repetition of ‘sea, hill, and 
wood’ has an incantatory quality, as though recitation can will them into existence; they are 
touchstones for Coleridge’s sense of being in the world. As in ‘Fears in Solitude’, self-
contemplation provokes contemplation of wider humanity; the multitudinous nature of the 
human world is once more emphasised. The village is ‘populous’ (l. 11), and the ‘goings on 
of life’ ‘numberless’ (l. 12). The silence, however, guarantees Coleridge’s separation from 
them; they may be populous and numberless, but they are also ‘[i]naudible as dreams’ (l. 13). 
That the existence and actions of other people are inaudible and dreamlike emphasises their 
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uncanny nature, and promotes Coleridge’s sense of alienation. Also, if the human world is 
dreamlike, its status and power as a real phenomenon is attenuated, and within the control of 
the dreamer. The ‘ought’ that signals the categorical imperative is, therefore, dispensed with; 
if humanity is a dream, the dreamer has no compunction to act in response to it.  
 Dorothea Brooke also contemplates the outside world from within, following her night 
of spiritual and emotional crisis. The language used to describe her perceptions of wider 
humanity closely parallels Coleridge’s; rather than resulting in a similar passivity and 
separation, however, Dorothea’s ‘vivid sympathetic experience’ asserts itself ‘as a power’, 
enabling action (p. 741). Eliot shows Dorothea, in her silence and isolation, viewing the world 
outside through the window of her boudoir. Unlike Coleridge, she is able to see people going 
about their daily business; the numberless goings on of life are visible to her, rather than 
concealed. The scene before her conveys with immediacy ‘the largeness of the world and the 
manifold wakings of men to labour and endurance’ (p. 741). ‘Manifold’ has the same 
meaning as ‘populous’ and ‘numberless’, but instead of inducing alienation and a dreamlike 
passivity, the silent scene instils a sense of purposeful action. Rather than confirming her 
separation, the outside world’s largeness confirms Dorothea’s inclusion and involvement 
within it: she is ‘part of that involuntary, palpitating life’ (p. 741). Eliot’s organicism could be 
summarised in this one phrase. Social life is an organism, with its own rhythms that palpitate 
like a pulse in the body, and no individual has a choice about whether or not to be part of it, 
because it is an involuntary condition of humanity. This assertion crystallises the difference 
between Coleridge and Eliot’s organicism; for Coleridge, the autonomy of the will means that 
he possesses the ability to stand outside and observe the numberless goings on of life. His 
involvement, or lack of it, is voluntary.  
Dorothea seeks the morally correct action that enables her to ‘rule her errant will’ (p. 
741) and overcome the pain that is conditioning her responses. The will is presented as a 
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malleable, rather than fixed, capacity, which may be regulated by the imposition of external 
influence. Eliot uses silence, once again, as a controlling mechanism that defends the self 
against painful emotion, when Dorothea speculates that the answer would come to her if she 
could ‘clutch [her] own pain, and compel it to silence’ (p. 741). Because of the immediacy of 
Dorothea’s involvement with her fellow human beings, she invokes the categorical 
imperative: ‘[w]hat should I do - how should I act now, this very day […]?’ (p. 741, my 
emphases). Thus, Eliot portrays organicism as the root of morality; she depicts ‘direct fellow-
feeling’ (p. 582), or sympathy, as a necessary precondition for moral thought and action.  
Eliot’s organicism differs from Coleridge’s in the extent of its materiality. Her 
depiction of Dorothea’s moral resolution demonstrates the extent to which action and 
interaction are essential to morality, because Dorothea asks not ‘what should I think’, but 
‘what should I do’. Coleridge maintained that ‘philosophy in its first principles must have a 
practical or moral, as well as theoretical or speculative side’, but his attempts to demonstrate 
that practicality in his poetry often founder on his difficulties with materiality and material 
objects.44 In ‘Frost at Midnight’, he attempts to present a ‘mirror’ (l. 22) of self through a 
material object, the film that flutters on the grate. He initially identifies with the ‘sole unquiet 
thing’ (l. 16) because of its uncanny and alien qualities, which echo his own alienation and 
uncanny perceptions of the outside world. As well as identification with its unquietness, 
though, he is able to effect a separation between himself, ‘me who live’ (l. 18), and its 
‘companionable form’ (l. 19). The ‘companionable’ imbues it with a kind of persona and 
agency, but it is distinguishable from a living form by this juxtaposition.  
Coleridge revised this section of the poem many times between 1798 and 1829; some 
of the most prominent changes occur in his depiction of the relationship between ‘spirit’ and 
                                                 
44 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Vol. I, Ch. 12, p. 251. 
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‘thing’ [APPENDIX 1].45 Every revision prior to the 1829 version contains the assertion that 
‘the living spirit in our frame / […] loves not to behold a lifeless thing’ (ll. 21-2); the 
continual revisions suggest that the interaction between self and other, ‘spirit’ and ‘lifeless 
thing’, was problematic for Coleridge. This juxtaposition remains, almost intact, while the 
surrounding lines inflect the relationship in various ways, through successive revisions. In the 
1829 version, the emotive ‘loves not’ and ‘lifeless thing’ are elided, in a compression of 
previous variations. The final form of the poem, which appeared in all subsequent editions of 
Coleridge’s poetry, presents the unquiet thing as an ‘echo or mirror’ of ‘the idling Spirit’ (ll. 
22, 20). The film is no longer a ‘lifeless thing’ that the spirit ‘loves not’; the problematic 
division between self and world has been commuted, and the material object is presented as 
an adjunct of non-material consciousness. With this adaptation, the thing loses its materiality, 
its thingness, and becomes subsumed by Coleridge’s reflections on the non-material self. This 
demonstrates his difficulties in bringing to fruition a synthesis of the theoretical and practical 
in his poetry in accordance with his assertion of the necessity of such a synthesis.  
Coleridge’s attempts to materialise his metaphysical speculations appear doomed to 
failure, and this has implications for the enactment of morality in his poetry. The speculations 
are mirrored back on the self, in an enclosed loop of referentiality, and there is no answer to 
the question, ‘what should I do - how should I act?’ Eliot, by contrast, portrays morality as a 
process that engages with the world and others, and returns to inform and enhance the moral 
viewpoint of the individual. This is the process of sympathy she champions throughout her 
novels; one in which the individual realises ‘with that distinctness which is no longer 
reflection but feeling - an idea wrought back to the directness of sense, like the solidity of 
                                                 
45 Jack Stillinger, Coleridge and Textual Instability: The Multiple Versions of the Major Poems (Oxford: OUP, 
1994), pp. 154-7. All further references will be given in the body of the text.  
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objects’, that others have ‘an equivalent centre of self’ (p. 198). Coleridge’s resistance to 
materiality condemns him to a passive isolation, from which he can only ‘yearn for human 
kind’ (l. 232), as he does at the conclusion of ‘Fears in Solitude’. Dorothea, in yearning 
‘towards the perfect Right’ (p. 741), exemplifies Eliot’s belief in the power of duty, and of 
moral action in the world. Her representation of the poetic soul as one ‘in which knowledge 
passes instantaneously into feeling, and feeling flashes back as a new organ of knowledge’ (p. 
209), depicts a process that bypasses involvement with others and, therefore, the attainment of 
sympathy; it seems an uncannily accurate description of Coleridge’s poetic method.  
Both Coleridge and Eliot reflected extensively on the nature and performance of duty. 
As Rosemary Ashton points out, Kant’s insistence on the performance of duty for its own 
sake was an element of his philosophy that ‘repelled’ Coleridge, who felt that duty and 
sympathy must be inherent and instinctual in the human response: ‘[d]oes even the sense of 
Duty rest satisfied with mere Actions, in the vulgar sense, does it not demand, & therefore 
produce, Sympathy itself as an Action?’46 This comment could be read as an assertion of the 
inextricable nature of the ‘Impulse’, as Coleridge called it, of sympathy, and the performance 
of duty. It could equally be construed as a manifesto for duty as an innate, rather than 
experiential quality, which requires no ‘mere’ action, ‘in the vulgar sense’, to make it real. 
Eliot’s commitment to the enactment of duty as a means of obtaining the sympathetic 
knowledge that liberates her characters from egoistic moral stupidity is encapsulated in 
Dorothea’s question: ‘What do we live for, if it is not to make life less difficult to each other?’ 
(p. 691). Her formulation of duty is both more active and more interactive in nature than 
Coleridge’s: we ‘make’ life less difficult ‘to each other’. Just as silence is often a faculty used 
                                                 
46 Coleridge, The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. K. Coburn (London: Pantheon, 1957), Vol. 1, 
1705. 
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to attain the self-command necessary for moral action in Eliot, and an external condition 
necessary for self-exploration in Coleridge, duty in Eliot enhances human interaction, while in 
Coleridge it remains latent and theoretical.   
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Chapter Three 
Symbolic Gestures: Narrative, Community, and Subjectivity 
In 1861 Henry Crabb Robinson compared Eliot’s Silas Marner with Coleridge’s ‘The Ancient 
Mariner’. He noted the novel’s ‘great affinity’ to the poem: ‘A little child, its mother having 
frozen to death at his solitary hovel, is taken in by Silas […] it is to him what the blessing of 
the animals is to the Ancient Mariner.’47 U. C. Knoepflmacher contends that: ‘[b]oth The Mill 
on the Floss and Silas Marner hark back to those poems of severance, loss, and expiation that 
had haunted the imaginations of Coleridge and Wordsworth at the turn of the century.’48 
Elsewhere, Knoepflmacher suggests that ‘[t]he man called ‘Old Master Marner’ belongs and 
does not belong to that disinherited race of wanderers who roam through the Lyrical Ballads. 
[…] His surname suggests his kinship to Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner.’49 While connections 
between Silas Marner and ‘The Ancient Mariner’ have been made before, none has focused 
on consonance and dissonance in the language, narrative structure, and use of symbolism of 
each in relation to the other. Close readings of the texts produce startling correspondences in 
the language used to describe alienation and isolation, ideas of community, and the 
experience of disembodied states. At the same time, the narrative of each text can be read as a 
reversal of the other, and each employs remarkably similar metaphorical language to 
characterise the nature of narrative. 
 Of his contributions to 1798’s Lyrical Ballads, which included ‘The Rime of the 
Ancyent Marinere’ , Coleridge wrote: ‘the incidents and agents were to be, in part at least, 
                                                 
47 Henry Crabb Robinson, Henry Crabb Robinson on Books and Their Writers, 3 vols, ed. Edith Morley 
(London: J. M. Dent, 1938), vol. 2, pp. 800-801. 
48 U. C. Knoepflmacher, ‘Wordsworthian Child of Nature’, in U. C. Knoepflmacher and G. B. Tennyson (eds), 
Nature and the Victorian Imagination  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 418. Many critics 
have noted Wordsworth’s influence on Silas Marner; David Carroll, for example, mentions the ‘many 
Wordsworthian echoes’ in the novel in his notes to the edition used here (George Eliot, Silas Marner, ed. David 
Carroll (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 192, n. 6). 
49 Knoepflmacher, George Eliot’s Early Novels, p. 233. 
42 
 
supernatural; and the excellence aimed at was to consist in the interesting of the affections by 
the dramatic truth of such emotions, as would naturally accompany such situations, supposing 
them real.’50 Of Eliot’s comments concerning her intentions in writing Silas Marner, those on 
creating ‘a sufficiently real background […] so that the presentation will lay hold on the 
emotions as human experience’ are significantly consonant with the qualities as those 
championed by Coleridge: the power of the emotions to engage, and the employment of 
elements ‘real’ enough to convince.51 Coleridge’s inclusion of supernatural ‘incidents and 
agents’ does not detract from the emotional power and impact of the ‘Mariner’, but his 
rendering of their effects produces a lack of coherence in his narrative radically at odds with 
the moral cohesion imposed on Eliot’s ‘legendary’ tale. One of the fundamental reasons for 
this divergence is the differing treatments of subjectivity in each narrative, which inform, and 
are informed by, agency, moral responsibility, and materiality. 
One of the most significant features of the narrative structures employed by Coleridge 
and Eliot is their reversal of each other. Silas Marner ends with a wedding feast, and the 
‘Mariner’ commences with one. In Marner, the wedding reconciles various elements of the 
plot, and Marner’s future status as an integral part of a family unit and of Raveloe’s 
community is ensured. The garden described in the penultimate paragraph of the novel is 
enclosed with stone walls on two sides, but presents a vista on the third, through which 
flowers greet the homecoming family ‘with answering gladness’.52 The combination of 
                                                 
50 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Vol. II, Ch. 14, p. 6. The version of ‘The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere’ that 
appeared in the 1798 edition of Lyrical Ballads has been used in this comparison because of Eliot’s reference to 
it in Adam Bede, the chronology of which [commencing ‘in the year of our Lord 1799’], supports this choice. 
For clarity, however, the most common spelling of the title, ‘The Ancient Mariner’, abbreviated to ‘Mariner’ is 
used henceforth. 
51 George Eliot, letter to Frederick Harrison, 15 August 1866, in Selections from George Eliot’s Letters, ed. 
Gordon S. Haight (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 318. 
52 George Eliot, Silas Marner, ed. David Carroll (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 183. All further references will be 
given in the body of the text. 
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security with a joyful and generative future is not difficult to extrapolate from this symbolism. 
Conversely, the wedding feast at the beginning of the ‘Mariner’ posits stability in its ritual, 
family, and community dimensions that is immediately broken up by the Mariner’s waylaying 
of the next of kin, which fragments the unity of the celebrations. 
 Fragmentation is the predominant motif of the narrative, which resists attempts to 
impose a unified meaning on its events and characters. The Mariner himself does not direct 
the action; despite his centrality, ‘he does not act, but is continually acted upon’, and his 
passivity negates the possibility of a story unified by stable characterisation, because events 
regulate his actions, rather than the opposite.53 These events, ‘having no necessary connection 
do not produce each other’, as Wordsworth observed.54  In Kantian terms, the operation of an 
autonomous will is omitted from the narrative, but so too is the law of causality. The absence 
of any system, either empirical or rational, by which narrative events may be understood, 
results in the unobtainability of a coherent framework for interpretation.55 The Mariner is 
separated from his country, his community of fellow mariners, and his vessel, which is finally 
broken up. Marner finds a new country, a new community, and a stable home that overcomes 
the threat of fragmentation presented by Eppie’s marriage. Yet, despite the oppositional 
nature of their plots, the ‘Mariner’ and Silas Marner contain ‘strange, striking’ similarities in 
their language, imagery, and use of symbolism.  
 Even though their narrative structures diverge so dramatically, the function of 
narratives as the telling of stories is foregrounded in both the ‘Mariner’ and Marner. The 
verbal qualities of storytelling are alluded to in Eliot’s passing reference to ‘the rapid use of 
                                                 
53 William Wordsworth’s prefatory note to ‘The Ancient Mariner’ in the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads, quoted 
in Keach’s notes to ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, in Coleridge, The Complete Poems, p. 497. 
54 Keach’s notes to the ‘Mariner’ in The Complete Poems, p. 497. 
55 As Edward E. Bostetter observes, in his seminal article ‘The Nightmare World of “The Ancient Mariner”’: 
‘Coleridge has created the kind of universe […] in which [the Mariner is] at the mercy of arbitrary and 
unpredictable forces.’ Studies in Romanticism, 1:4 (1962), pp. 241-54, p. 251. 
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that difficult instrument the tongue’, which alienates the ‘honest folk’ (p. 5) of village 
communities like Raveloe. ‘I have strange power of speech’, claims the Mariner, and, in spite 
of the alienating effect caused by his appearance and manner, this strange power compels his 
listeners, who ‘cannot chuse but hear’.56 The uncanny power of speech is alluded to in both 
narratives: Godfrey Cass is ‘unexpectedly awed by the weaver’s direct truth-speaking’ (p. 
170); and the Mariner’s repeated ‘Listen, Stranger!’ (ll. 45, 49, 205) reinforces both the 
imperative nature and the strange, uncanny quality of his speech.    
The thing that Silas Marner, the weaver of Raveloe, weaves, and the Mariner tells, is 
the ‘tale’ (p. 9; l. 623). Weaving is a relatively straightforward metaphor for storytelling; read 
in conjunction with the Mariner’s compulsive tale-telling, though, it takes on a different 
aspect. The ‘tale’ of the cloth woven by Marner is its amount, or number of pieces, and the 
telling, or (re)counting, of the tale is an indication of its weight. Metaphors proliferate, 
revealing a symbolic language shared by Eliot and Coleridge. Eliot claimed that the 
inspiration for Silas Marner was her ‘recollection of having once, in early childhood, seen a 
linen-weaver with a bag on his back’, and her novel describes ‘these pale men [who] rarely 
stirred abroad without that mysterious burden’ (p. 5).57 The burden of the tale is the weight of 
its telling; an apposite summary of the Mariner’s burden. The mystery of the burden is in its 
unknowable qualities; its concealment, from visual interpretation in Marner and from rational 
interpretation in the ‘Mariner’ presents intriguing parallels. Knoepflmacher notes the way in 
which ‘the factual and symbolic qualify each other’ in Silas Marner; Eliot’s factual 
descriptions also function as symbolic representations of her own and Coleridge’s themes.58  
                                                 
56 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere’ in Seven Parts, in The Collected Poems, pp. 
147-167, ll. 620, 22, 42. All further references will be given in the body of the text.  
57 George Eliot, letter to John Blackwood, 24 February 1861, in Selections from George Eliot’s Letters, p. 258. 
58 Knoepflmacher, George Eliot’s Early Novels, p. 233. 
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The ‘hopeless riddle’ of Marner’s ‘strange world’ (p. 19) aptly describes that in which 
the Mariner is compelled to tell and retell his tale; ‘he might, if he had a less intense nature, 
have sat weaving, weaving - looking towards the end of his pattern, or towards the end of his 
web, till he forgot the riddle’ (p. 19), comments Eliot. The Mariner’s inability to offer 
interpretation of his experiences, combined with the ‘anguish [that] comes and makes me tell’ 
(l. 617), is redolent of that ‘weaving, weaving’ which sees only the end of the pattern – the 
possibility of redemption – and omits the reasons for, or answers to, the riddle of how and 
why the situation has come about; like the Mariner, Marner seems ‘to weave […] from pure 
impulse, without reflection’ (p. 16). The ‘monotony’ of the loom, which fills Marner’s 
hearing, the ‘sameness’ of the web he weaves, and the ‘repetition’ of his movements (p. 21) 
exemplify the combination of factual and symbolic representation in Eliot that describes, with 
equal poignancy, the lives of both Marner and the Mariner.  
While the loose threads of Marner’s life are eventually woven together by Eliot, the 
Mariner’s story presents a progressive unravelling of the factors that humanise and situate 
characters in narratives. This dehumanisation of character evinces the Hermit’s appalled 
‘[s]ay quick […] I bid thee say, / What manner of man art thou?’ (ll. 609-10). Prior to 
Marner’s redemption through his relationship with Eppie, Eliot places him outside the web of 
community and familial relationships, as isolated a character as the Mariner. Characters like 
Marner are ‘to the last regarded as aliens by their rustic neighbours, and usually contract[ed] 
the eccentric habits which belong to a state of loneliness’ (p. 6); this description identifies 
succinctly the alienation evoked by individuals like the Mariner, who wanders ‘from land to 
land’, and cannot be placed, or have no place, within the interrelationships of the narrative. 
The language of isolation in Marner corresponds closely to that in the ‘Mariner’. Marner 
recognises himself as a ‘lone thing’ (p. 118), and a ‘lone man’ (p. 149), while the Mariner 
creates a refrain from his lone state: ‘Alone, alone, all, all alone, / Alone on the wide, wide 
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Sea’ (ll. 224-5). The expanse around him emphasises the smallness of his individual 
existence, and this imagery is paralleled in the observation that the loss of his gold leaves 
Marner’s ‘soul like a forlorn traveller on an unknown desert’ (p. 44). Reference to the soul 
introduces a further dimension of loneliness: that of spiritual isolation, a theme which is 
woven through Coleridge’s poem, and is summarised in the Mariner’s anguished observation: 
‘So lonely ’twas, that God himself / Scarce seemèd to be there’ (ll. 632-3).  
Further parallels in the depiction of physical and spiritual desolation are to be found in 
references in both narratives to the country of origin. These references bring together several 
aspects of the lone state: separation from community; estrangement from familiar customs 
and beliefs; loss of origins; and lack of connection with the divine. Marner’s observation that 
‘your ways are different: my country was a good way off’ (p. 124) is spoken in the context of 
a conversation about the appropriate moral and religious education for Eppie; Dolly’s distress 
concerning Marner’s apparent lack of familiarity with prayers mistakes his unfamiliarity with 
local religious forms for absence of knowledge of God. The Mariner’s joyful recognition of 
‘the Hill [and] the Kirk’ (l. 471) is inflected by his questioning of whether this is truly his 
‘own countrèe’ (l. 472), and the instability of his perceptions turns out to be justified. The 
Hermit, who represents local religious authority in the ‘Mariner’, ‘loves to talk with 
Marineres / That come from a far Contrèe’ (ll. 550-1); his willingness to embrace the 
unfamiliar in this way makes doubly poignant his rejection of a man whose faith originates in 
his own country, who regards him as a figure with the power to redeem his perceived sins, 
and yet who is unrecognisable and appalling to him. Although he is now ‘in [his] own 
Countrèe’ (l. 603), the Mariner experiences loss of home at the deepest and most painful 
level.  
Marner’s return to his ‘old country’ is inextricably linked with his sense of origin; it is 
‘the town where [he] was born’ (p. 177). The ‘old place is all swep’ away’, however, and 
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Marner concludes that ‘the old home’s gone’ (p. 179). Not only are his home and his origin 
unobtainable; his sense of religious place is also lost to him in the sweeping away of the 
chapel and the graveyard. The reversal of narratives becomes once more apparent here; 
having lost his original home, Marner concludes that he has ‘no home but [Raveloe] now’ (p. 
179); but the Mariner’s ‘woeful agony’ (l. 612) on the discovery of his irretrievable loss of 
home and the possibility of redemption ‘forc[es]’ (l. 613) the compulsive repetition of his tale. 
Eliot gives Marner the wholeness to choose a new home, but Coleridge amplifies the 
Mariner’s fragmentation, instability, and estrangement. 
 Despite the Mariner’s strange power of speech, and his intuitive power to ‘know the 
man that must hear’ him (l. 622), he is unable to free himself from the constraining force of 
his periodic ‘anguish’ (l. 617). Marner, too, is subject to recurrent ‘visitation[s]’ (p. 12), in 
which he is ‘arrested […] by the invisible wand of catalepsy’ (p. 110). Eliot’s descriptions of 
Marner’s epileptic fits imbue them with uncanny dimensions; these centre on ambiguity about 
whether he is dead or alive. Similar ambiguities abound in the Mariner’s description of his 
fellow mariners; a large part of the supernatural horror of the ‘Mariner’ is produced by the 
animation of his supposedly dead shipmates. Language similarities in these descriptions are 
notable for their focus on the eyes and the gaze. Marner is described by the local girls as ‘a 
dead man come to life again’, partly because of his ‘pale face and unexampled eyes’, and 
partly because of Jem Rodney’s discovery of Marner in a cataleptic state, when his eyes are 
‘set like a dead man’s’ (p. 8). The Mariner is horrified by ‘the curse in a dead man’s eye’ (l. 
250), the accusing ‘look’ (l. 247) concentrated upon him by the other mariners. Marner’s 
myopic ‘gaze’ (p. 6) has malign powers attributed to it by the local boys; it is ‘always enough 
to make them take to their legs in terror’ in the belief that the ‘dreadful stare could dart cramp, 
or rickets, or a wry mouth’ (p. 6). As well as language similarities, there is a further reversal 
of effect in these portrayals. The power of the malign gaze is attributed, albeit through 
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superstition, to Marner; this enables Eliot to demonstrate the power of sympathy to overcome 
aversion based on ignorance of a person’s true nature, as she does in depicting Marner’s 
integration into the community. The Mariner, however, is the object of the malign gaze, and 
the curse is projected on to him, rather than by him. There is no reconciliation for him, as 
there is for Marner; his shipmates’ spirits are eventually liberated, but his memory of ‘the 
pang, the curse, with which they died’ (l. 443) remains unameliorated. 
 The words ‘fit’ and ‘trance’ are used in relation to both Marner and the Mariner, 
further blurring the boundaries between conscious and unconscious, dreaming and waking 
states, and contributing to the uncanny dimensions of their subjects. Marner regards his fits as 
a state of being ‘not in the body, but out of the body’ (p. 12). One feature of the Mariner’s 
trance (l. 435) distinguishes it from Marner’s: he is subjected to an otherworldly discourse 
debating his actions and their consequences. Eliot ensures that the reader will place no 
supernatural interpretation on Marner’s fits by emphasising ‘the absence […] of any spiritual 
vision during his outward trance’ (p. 10). She portrays the villagers’ superstitious fears about 
Marner’s ‘fits’ (p. 8) in the context of her own empirical explanation, while simultaneously 
promoting, through descriptive language, the defamiliarising effect upon Marner’s 
neighbours. Coleridge offers no contextual information concerning the Mariner’s trance, or 
any of his experiences; they could be visionary or delusional in nature. The Mariner perceives 
himself as having been, like Marner, in a disembodied state, in which his ‘soul discern[s]’ (l. 
401) his experience, but his ‘living life’ (l. 400) has momentarily left him. Like his fellow 
mariners, the Mariner’s status as a living being is suspended. Marner is similarly depicted as a 
non-living being in repeated references to his appearance as ‘an apparition’ (pp. 55, 114) and 
‘an apparition from the dead’ (p. 114).  
 However, these uncanny constructions of character serve to highlight the differing 
narrative directions of their authors. Eliot’s portrayal of Marner as strange, estranged and 
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otherworldly enables her to depict his redemption through Eppie. In contrast with his soulless 
state, he is once more part of the natural and human world, ‘his soul, long stupefied in a cold 
narrow prison, […] trembling gradually into full consciousness’ (p. 126). Conversely, the 
Mariner’s perception that he may have ‘died in sleep, / And [become] a blessed Ghost’ (ll. 
299-300) is not reversed; rather, it is compounded by his self-depiction as ‘[l]ike one that hath 
been seven days drown’d’ (l. 585), and by the responses of his rescuers and the Hermit. He 
remains otherworldly and, with his ‘glittering eye’ (ll. 3, 17), reminiscent of his dead 
shipmates. Even his resemblance to them does not broker a sense of community with the other 
mariners. When they re-animate and begin once more to ‘work the ropes’ (l. 329), it is in eerie 
silence, and the Mariner, standing next to ‘the body of [his] brother’s son’ (l. 333) pulls at the 
same rope, but is not acknowledged or spoken to. In the midst of this ‘ghastly crew’ (l. 332), 
it is himself that the Mariner perceives as other; he ‘quake[s] to think of [his] own voice / 
How frightful it would be!’ (ll. 337-8). Later, he believes himself to be invisible to the living 
dead who surround him: ‘[t]hought I, I am as thin as air - / They cannot me behold’ (ll. 376-
7). Even in the company of the undead, the Mariner is separate, his sense of identity 
estranged, and all possibility of community fragmented. Eppie enables Marner’s 
understanding of himself as an integral part of community life, from which he had previously 
‘stood aloof as from a strange thing, wherewith he could have no communion’ (p. 130). 
 Coleridge and Eliot use similar symbolic language to describe the potential for a 
reversal of isolation, and the possibility of communion, in two events that mirror each other 
structurally as well as linguistically: when the Mariner blesses the water-snakes, and Eppie is 
drawn by the light from Marner’s cottage. Eppie sees the ‘bright glancing light on the white 
ground’, and is ‘immediately absorbed in watching the bright living thing’ (p. 109). The 
water-snakes move ‘in tracks of shining white’ (l. 266), their beauty provoking the Mariner’s 
exclamation, ‘O happy living things!’ (l. 274). Of symbolism, Coleridge wrote that ‘[a]n 
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IDEA, in the highest sense of that word, cannot be conveyed but by a symbol’; in Kantian 
terms, symbols function as ‘metaphorical substitutes for the transcendent realities they purport 
to describe’, as Brice summarises.59 The symbolic nature of the language used by both 
Coleridge and Eliot in these descriptions can be inferred from the supernatural, or 
transcendent, qualities attributed to the things described. Eppie’s physical situation in the 
snowy night is life-threatening, and the light represents her rescue on a practical level; on a 
symbolic level, it functions as a metaphorical substitute for the idea of Marner’s redemption 
from the darkness of his isolation. The whiteness of the snow-covered ground is a symbolic 
manifestation of the purity of the child’s innocence, an appropriate backdrop for her role as 
the bringer of hope into Marner’s life. The bright living thing is, therefore, simultaneously the 
physical light issuing from Marner’s cottage, the person of Eppie, and the qualities she 
represents in the narrative.  
 The tracks of the water-snakes are ‘shining white’; their supernatural dimensions are 
emphasised by the ‘elfish light’ (l. 267) generated by their movements. Unlike the light seen 
by Eppie, however, they are resistant to material interpretation; they are held fast in the realm 
of metaphor and potential. Rather than offering a material means of escaping his predicament, 
as the light from Marner’s cottage does for both himself and Eppie, their shining white tracks 
remain separated, elementally, in water which would drown the Mariner should he follow 
their light. His only possible connection with them is visual and emotional. They function as 
metaphorical substitutes for the possibility of redemption, because their indescribable beauty 
causes the Mariner to bless them, thereby recovering his ability to pray, upon which the 
Albatross falls from his neck. However, his act of prayer does not free him from either his 
physical entrapment or psychological burden. The water-snakes enable a ‘spring of love’ (l. 
                                                 
59 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Vol. I, Ch. 9, p. 156; Brice, Coleridge and Scepticism, p. 93. 
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276) to issue from the Mariner’s heart; like Eppie, they have the power to effect this change, 
but the Mariner is unable to sustain it. Both the Mariner and Marner are passive recipients of 
gifts; the ‘flash of golden fire’ (l. 273) caused by the water-snakes’ tracks and the gold of 
Eppie’s hair in the firelight are uncannily analogous. If the water-snakes symbolise the 
transformative power of love in the ‘Mariner’, that power is realised only contingently. Eliot’s 
symbolic use of light and the living thing illustrates Marner’s assertion that ‘things will 
change’ (p. 149); Coleridge’s symbolism, despite the vital dimensions of the happy living 
things, reinforces the unchanging nature of the Mariner’s alienation. 
 Symbolism is also used in both narratives to denote disruption to ethical order. In Eliot 
this is temporary, but in Coleridge moral signification is more radically and permanently 
unsettled. The drawing of lots to determine Marner’s guilt or innocence at the beginning of 
Silas Marner results in the initial injustice that drives him away from his religious community 
and causes the ‘despair in his soul [and a] shaken trust in God and man, which is little short of 
madness to a loving nature’ (p. 14). Eliot’s narrative requires faith to be lost in order to 
demonstrate the power of love to restore it. No such restoration is possible in the ‘Mariner’; 
he is, by his own confession, guilty of killing the Albatross, and his despair is enduring. 
Stokes comments on ‘the inability of readers to fully rationalise […] ethical order’ in the 
‘Mariner’, because of the apparent randomness of the killing and all subsequent events, and 
the fact that ‘the bird seems to have no obvious or lucid moral or religious significance.’60 
This element of randomness is paralleled in the playing of dice for the souls of the mariners, 
which is in turn mirrored by the drawing of lots to decide Marner’s fate.  
Although the Mariner views his act as a sin, this is not the definitive verdict on the 
killing; even his fellow mariners cannot decide whether it has brought good or bad luck: 
                                                 
60 Stokes, Coleridge, Language and the Sublime, pp. 86-7. 
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‘[a]nd I had done an hellish thing […] For all averr’d, I had kill’d the Bird / That made the 
Breeze to blow’ (ll. 91-2) is countered in the following stanza by ‘Then all averr’d, I had 
kill’d the Bird / That brought the fog and mist. / ‘Twas right, said they, such birds to slay’ (ll. 
95-7). This volte face is occasioned by the sunrise that dispels the mist; when the weather 
changes again, the mariners once more change their minds. These ‘arbitrary and unpredictable 
forces’, as Bostetter calls them, deprive the Mariner of any sense of agency; his act is ‘a 
compulsive sin which strips away the illusion of freedom and reveals just how helpless he 
is.’61  
Eliot gives Marner a far greater sense of agency, although this is also contingent. 
When his gold is stolen, he agonises over the thief’s identity: 
Was it a thief who had taken the bags? or was it a cruel power that no hands could 
reach which had delighted in making him a second time desolate? He shrank from his 
vaguer dread, and fixed his mind with struggling effort on the robber with hands, who 
could be reached by hands (p. 44). 
 
Marner’s focus on hands is an attempt to make the responsibility for the crime material and 
tangible; human, rather than the act of a ‘cruel power’, over which there is no possibility of 
control. Hands denote human agency, for Eliot, and this is particularly compelling in the 
context of Coleridge’s multiple references to the Mariner’s ‘skinny hand’ (ll. 13, 217, 221). If 
a cruel power is responsible for the Mariner’s suffering, these allusions are problematic. The 
Mariner’s hand ‘holds’ (l. 13) the wedding-guest, and is an object of fear to him; if the 
Mariner is not culpable, there is no apparent reason for his hand to inspire such revulsion. The 
spiralling instability of events in the ‘Mariner’ undermines causal links, including the 
causality of reason, and the link between the act and its moral consequences is likewise 
troubled. It could be that the thinness of the Mariner’s hand is a device to render him 
uncanny, more corpse-like – at one point, the wedding-guest is unsure if he is alive or dead – 
                                                 
61 Bostetter, ‘The Nightmare World of “The Ancient Mariner”’, p. 251. 
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but the repetition implies his sense of culpability, regardless of the absence of causal evidence 
supporting his subjective viewpoint.  
 Stokes observes that ‘the subject is something that can terrify itself and struggles to 
know itself’.62 The dialogue heard by the Mariner in his trance is unequivocal on one point: 
his moral responsibility for the death of the ‘harmless Albatross’ (l. 406). One voice is harshly 
judgemental, and stresses, in Christ’s name, the cruelty of a crime against love; the other, a 
‘softer voice’ (l. 411) argues that the Mariner ‘hath penance done, / And penance more will 
do’ (ll. 413-4). Each of these voices could be projection of the Mariner’s own subjectivity, his 
sense of a ‘guilt resistant to rational explication’, as Stokes puts it.63 Could it be his own 
subjectivity that haunts the Mariner, producing his anguish and compelling the repetition of 
his tale? His request to be shriven of his sin by the Hermit suggests that this is so; it is ‘the 
Albatross’s blood’ (l. 546) that he wishes washed away, and there is no robust analogy here, 
despite suggestive symbolic links, with the redemption of sins through Christ’s blood. The 
mistaken identity of the sin to be expiated is mirrored in the necessity of Marner’s atonement, 
in the eyes of his church, for a sin he has not committed, for ‘only on confession, as the sign 
of repentance, could he be received once more within the fold of the church’ (p. 13).  
 The community thus restored to Marner would be predicated on a false premise, a 
false confession. Eliot’s moral order ensures that Marner does not make this mistake, and he 
is eventually rewarded by a restoration of faith in human nature, and in a form of religion very 
different from that of his old country. Dolly insists that Eppie be brought up ‘like christened 
folks’s children’, taken to church, and taught her catechism: ‘the “I believe,” and everything, 
and “hurt nobody by word or deed”’ (p. 123). This last manifestation of faith is consonant 
with the Mariner’s insistence that ‘[h]e prayeth well who loveth well, / Both man and bird and 
                                                 
62 Stokes, Coleridge, Language and the Sublime, p. 104. 
63 Stokes, Coleridge, Language and the Sublime, p. 105. 
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beast’ (ll. 645-6). Despite the reversal of narratives that ensures Marner’s stability within 
family, community and church, and the Mariner’s instability in the expectation of any life 
everlasting but the agonising one he is condemned to live, Eliot and Coleridge seem 
concordant on this point.  
Eliot’s repetition, in differing contexts, of her essential message that ‘the same cause 
would produce the same effect’ (p. 127) and that things can and do change, if the will is there, 
is accretive in effect. The effect of Coleridge’s repetitions is to foreground the lack of 
causality in the Mariner’s tale; instead of emphasising any continuity, they draw attention to 
its lack, and, rather than binding together, they reveal the predominating fragmentation in the 
narrative. Stokes suggests that one reason for this may be Coleridge’s doctrinal position on 
sin and atonement, which he sees as being in a transitional phase in 1798; he argues that the 
‘divided tone’ of the poem derives from ‘Coleridge’s difficult passage between Unitarianism 
and Anglicanism.’64 Eliot’s conception of love as a source of redemption reflects her belief in 
the power of sympathy to reconcile individuals to each other, to the morally correct course of 
action, and to themselves. 
  
                                                 
64 Stokes, Coleridge, Language and the Sublime, p. 95. 
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Conclusion: ‘the double change of self and observer’65 
Despite the lack of evidence supporting an argument for Coleridge’s direct influence on 
Eliot’s fiction, the accretive effect produced by the high incidence of correlative language 
discussed above suggests a greater affinity than has been established previously. Linguistic 
correspondences often foreground divergences in Coleridge and Eliot’s ideas, but these 
divergences are not universal. Formulations of imagination and sympathy, the ‘given’ nature 
of inspiration and direction, the imagery used to represent the defamiliarising effects of grief 
and the chaos lying beyond silence, as well as common use of biblical allusion, all point to 
convergences in outlook in these areas.  
 However, the philosophical divergences identified in this enquiry suggest something 
quite different. I have investigated many instances where linguistic and thematic parallels 
reveal radically differing meanings in their presentation. Coleridge’s preoccupation with 
subjective experience contrasts with Eliot’s emphasis on interaction between individuals on a 
material, rather than theoretical, level. The increased materiality of Eliot’s presentations, 
compared with Coleridge’s, characterises many of the areas discussed. Her uses of silence 
regulate interaction; Coleridge’s condition his isolation. Eliot’s formulation of organicism 
stresses the reciprocal and interdependent nature of human relationships; Coleridge’s 
accentuates the metaphysical dimensions of nature and individual freedom. While Coleridge 
believes duty to be innate, and regards it as a theoretical imperative, Eliot presents it as a 
practical quality, administered externally, and realised only through action.  
   For Coleridge, subjectivism frequently results in a passivity that guarantees his 
continued isolation; the agency attributed to Eliot’s characters enables their apprehension of 
sympathy and correct moral action. This leads to a moral cohesion in her narratives which 
                                                 
65 George Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 88. 
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contrasts dramatically with the instability and fragmentation potential in all of Coleridge’s 
meditations upon the self. The ‘double change of self and observer’ referred to in 
Middlemarch crystallises the contrast between Coleridge and Eliot’s representations of the 
self in the world. Change is possible for Eliot’s characters, because they interact on a material 
level, but for Coleridge, change must be generated through transcendence of the material 
world, which is not always possible within the limits of subjectivity. 
 Yet, even in the context of these striking contrasts, remarkable analogies persist. Here 
is Coleridge’s description of one of his periodic bouts of despair: 
The Poet is dead in me – my imagination (or rather the Somewhat that had been 
imaginative) lies, like a Cold Snuff on the circular Rim of a Brass Candle-stick, 
without even a stink of Tallow to remind you that it was once clothed & mitred with 
Flame.66  
 
Compare his use of imagery with Eliot’s celebrated description of ‘egoism’ in Middlemarch: 
 
Your pier-glass […] will be minutely and multitudinously scratched in all directions; 
but place now against it a lighted candle as a centre of illumination, and lo! the 
scratches will seem to arrange themselves in a fine series of concentric circles around 
that little sun (p. 248). 
 
There is little possibility – and  no evidence – of Eliot having read Coleridge’s letters, yet the 
similarity in their choice of imagery points to shared perceptions of the nature of self. This 
example also characterises their differences: Coleridge is talking about himself, and Eliot is 
critiquing the nature of egoism. Although direct influence is not demonstrable, some kind of 
transition, if not transmission, of ideas can be inferred from such congruent imagery. I have 
not done justice in this study to the richness and complexity of Eliot’s fiction, or the beauty 
and resonance of Coleridge’s poetry – that has not been my aim – but I hope I have 
                                                 
66 Coleridge, letter to William Godwin, March 1801, in Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl 
Leslie Griggs, 6 vols (Oxford: OUP, 1956-71), vol. 2, p. 714. 
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made more manifest the possibility of those ‘suppressed transitions which unite all 
contrasts’.67 
  
                                                 
67 George Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 181. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, from ‘Frost at Midnight’: 
 
 
1. 
[…] a companionable form, 
With which I can hold commune. Idle thought!   20 
But still the living spirit in our frame, 
That loves not to behold a lifeless thing […] (Version 1, 1798) 
 
 
2. 
[…] a companionable form, 
With which I can commune: haply hence,    20 
That still the living spirit in our frame, 
Which loves not to behold a lifeless thing […] (Version 3, Poetical Register, 1808-9) 
 
 
 
3. 
[…] a companionable form, 
To which the living spirit in our frame,    20 
That loves not to behold a lifeless thing,  
Transfuses its own pleasure, its own will. (Version 6, 1817)68 
 
 
 
4.  
[…] the thin blue flame 
Lies on my low burnt fire, and quivers not; 
Only that film, which fluttered on the grate, 
Still flutters there, the sole unquiet thing. 
Methinks, its motion in this hush of nature 
Gives it dim sympathies with me who live, 
Making it a companionable form, 
Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit   20 
By its own moods interprets, every where 
Echo or mirror seeking of itself, 
And makes a toy of Thought.  (Version 10, 1829)69 
 
                                                 
68 Versions 1, 2, and 3 of these lines: Jack Stillinger, Coleridge & Textual Instability: The Multiple Versions of 
the Major Poems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 52-8 and 154-7, ll.  
69 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘Frost at Midnight’, in The Complete Poems, ed. William Keach (London: Penguin 
(Penguin Classics), 1997), pp. 231-3, ll. 13-23. 
